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Recent literature in the Philosophy of Language has
focused on

a

variety of puzzles about de se belief —belief

about oneself formed by the use of the indexical

reflexive pronoun 'she herself'.

'I'

or the

These puzzle cases suggest

that de se belief cannot be represented in the traditional

way as a two-place relation between an individual and
proposition.

a

Nevertheless, there are some versions of this

traditional analysis that have not been fully discussed in
the literature.
In this dissertation

I

examine a number of proposals

for analyzing de se belief, and show how many of these

entail privileged access for the agents of self-attributed
belief.

Privileged access for an agent takes the form of

either a proposition or a belief that only the agent can
entertain. Privileged access emerges as

a

consequence of

two-place relations of belief between believers and

propositions when the proposition is construed as a firstperson proposition,

a

individual essence, or

first-person propositional guise, an
a

Fregean

iv

'I'

thought.

In all these

.

cases

I

argue that privileged access for an agent leads to

counter-intuitive consequences about sentence meaning and
belief content.

For this reason

I

avoid privileged access altogether.

investigate ways to
I

conclude that the

most viable alternatives are three-place relations of
belief

v
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CHAPTER

1

DE SE BELIEF

Introduction
At one stage of his intellectual odyssey, Bertrand

Russell believed that the speakers of sentences containing
'I'

had privileged access to the propositions expressed by

those sentences.

In a sense, these propositions were

inaccessible to all but the speakers of indexical sentences.

Russell's view resulted from his account of the meanings of
logically proper names, and an epistemological theory about

acguaintance

.

While most philosophers have since rejected

Russell's characterization of knowledge by acguaintance, the
main themes that guided Russell's thinking during this
period emerge in much of the contemporary philosophical
literature about de se belief (belief about oneself).
this reason

I

1

For

begin by explaining what privileged access

meant for Russell.

In doing so

I

identify some of the

background assumptions that inspire contemporary versions
of privileged access.

Privileged Access

— An

In The Problems of Philosophy

Early View
2

.

Russell describes a

particular case of knowledge by acguaintance.

Consider his

description of the proposition that Bismarck is acquainted
with when he makes

a

statement about himself.

1

Suppose some statement made about
Bismarck.
Assuming that there is such a
thing as direct acguaintance with
oneself Bismarck himself might have
used his name directly to designate the
particular person with whom he was
acquainted.
In this case, if he made a
judgement about himself, he himself
might be a constituent of the judgement.
Here the proper name has the direct use
which it always wishes to have, as
simply standing for a certain object,
and not for a description of the
object 3
,

.

Later, Russell adds this about the Bismarck example:
It would seem that, when we make a
statement about something only known by
description, we often intend to make our
statement, not in the form involving the
description, but about the actual thing
described. That is to say, when we say
anything about Bismarck, we should like,
if we could, to make the judgement which
Bismarck alone can make, namely, the
judgement of which he himself is a
constituent.
In this we are necessarily
defeated, since the actual Bismarck is
unkown to us.
But we know that there is
an object B, called Bismarck, and that B
was an astute diplomatist. We can thus
describe the proposition we should like
to affirm, namely, 'B was an astute
diplomatist', where B is the object
which was Bismarck.
If we are
describing Bismarck as 'the first
Chancellor of the German Empire', the
proposition we should like to affirm may
be described as 'the proposition
asserting, concerning the actual object
which was the first Chancellor of the
German Empire, that this object was an
This
astute diplomatist'.
proposition, which is described and is
known to be true, is what interests us;
but we are not acquainted with the
proposition itself, and do not know it
though we know it is true 4
.

.

.

.

.

What is notable about this example is the suggestion
that only Bismarck can be acquainted with the judgment about

2

*

himself containing Bismarck as

a

constituent.

One

immediately wants to know— What proposition
does Bismarck
assert about himself, and why is it only
Bismarck
can be

acquainted with this proposition?

Russell's answers to

these questions are tied up with his account
of the meanings
of logically proper names, and an epistemological
theory
about acquaintance.
In Principia Mathematica 5 and Introduction to

Mathematical—Philosophy

8
,

Russell distinguishes between

siriiular terms that are logically proper names and singular

terms that are descriptions.

About names, Russell says:

a name,
is a simple symbol,
directly designating an individual which
is its meaning, and having this meaning
in its own right, independently of the
meanings of all other words 7
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Elsewhere Russell tells us that it is only names that occur
as genuine subjects in sentences of the subject-predicate
form.

If a name is truly a logically proper name then "it

must name something ." 8

The meaning of each such name is

exhausted by the object for which the name stands.

Whenever the grammatical subject of a
proposition can be supposed not to exist
without rendering the proposition
meaningless, it is plain that the
grammatical subject is not a proper
name, i.e., not a name directly
representing some object 9
.

Russell also thought that most of the singular terms

that we commonly regard as proper names are not logically

proper names.

The expressions that Russell identified as

the genuine proper names were 'this',

3

'that',

'now'

and

I
'

'

expressions we would call 'indexicals'
and

'

demonstratives

in contemporary terminology.

If Bismarck uses a logically proper
name like

make

I
•

statement about himself, then the meaning
of
the denotation of this expression as Bismarck
uses

•

a

'I'

it.

to
is

The

judgment Bismarck alone can make contains the
denotation of
I
on this occasion of use as a constituent of
the

proposition Bismarck expresses by his statement.
obvious what

'I'

it is not

denotes, as Bismarck uses this expression,

since Russell says that the actual Bismarck is unknown to
us.

We can merely describe the proposition that contains

the denotation of

'I'

as Bismarck uses it, while Bismarck,

alone,

is acquainted with this proposition.

is so,

it is useful to know what Russell means by

'acquaintance'.

To see why this

He describes this relation by saying:

We shall say that we have
acquaintance with anything of which we
are directly aware, and without the
intermediary of any process of inference
or any knowledge of truths 10
.

Russell tells us the things we are acquainted with are
sense-data, such as shape, color, hardness, etc., or

whatever we are immediately conscious of that makes up the
appearance of physical objects.

In addition to sense-data

we are also acquainted with past events in virtue of having

immediate knowledge of these events by memory.

And, we have

acquaintance with certain states of mind by introspection,
as when we become aware of our own perceptions.

4

.

Furthermore, in The Problems of Philosophy

,.

suggests that we know the truth of sentences like

Russell
'I

am

acquainted with this sense-datum' only because we
are
acquainted with something we call 'I', or Self— though
he
concedes it is only probable that we are acquainted
with a
Self. 11

Bismarck's self— the subject of experience— is the

object of acquaintance that is a constituent of the
P ro P°sition Bismarck expresses when he uses a sentence

containing 'I'.

What and how Bismarck knows about his own

mental states are different from what and how we know about

Bismarck's mental states.

introspection

,

Bismarck knows about himself by

while we are only aware of Bismarck in virtue

of being presented with sense-data from his body, or even

more indirectly, from reading about him. 12

Because the

object of acquaintance is a subjective Self, only Bismarck
can be acquainted with any proposition that contains this

Self as a constituent.
a

Hence, any proposition expressed by

sentence containing the name

only the subject of

'I'

is a proposition to which

'I'

has epistemic access.

This is one

sense in which individuals may be said to have privileged

access to propositions.

However, more contemporary versions

of privileged access can be found in the philosophical

literature
Some philosophers have rejected Russell's commitment to
selves, but still hold that there are propositions that only

one person can grasp

propositions'. 13

—

I

call these 'first-person

In Chapters 1-5

5

I

present arguments for

first-person propositions and discuss why these propositions
are objectionable.

In Chapters

6

and

7

I

consider ways to

avoid first-person propositions, and privileged access
altogether.

Each of the proposals

I

discuss throughout the

dissertation offers some analysis of beliefs that are formed
by use of the indexical 'I', or the reflexive pronoun 'she

herself' or 'he himself'.

Moreover, each analysis appears

in part, by a particular kind of example.

to be motivated,

In the next section

I

present and discuss several versions

of this example.

The Irreplacabilitv Thesis

The distinctive character of de se belief was brought
to the attention of philosophers by a series of articles by
H.N. Castaneda, 14 though Castaneda himself credits P.

Geach 15 with articulating these examples for the first time.
In "'He': A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness,"

Castaneda is interested in drawing attention to the logical
status of
is used ".

particular use of the pronoun 'he'.

a
.

.

When 'he'

as a pointer to the object of someone's self-

16 then 'he' is
knowledge, self-belief, or self-conjecture,"

short for 'he himself'.

Castaneda identifies this

particular use of 'he' as 'he*'.
'he*'

Since Castaneda's work on

about de se
is the catalyst for much of the literature

belief,

I

quote his example in its entirety.

Suppose that a man called Privatus
informs his friend Gaskon that
knows that
(1) The Editor of Soul
millionaire.
he* is a
6

.

.

,

The token n of 'he*' in (1) is
not a proxy for 'the Editor of Soul
If it were statement (1) would be the
same statement as:
(2) The Editor of Soul knows that
the Editor of Soul is a
millionaire
But (2) is not the same statement as
For (1) does not entail (2).
(1).
The
Editor of Soul may know that he himself
is a millionaire while failing to know
that he himself is the Editor of Soul
because, say, he believes that the
Editor of Soul is poverty-stricken
Richard Penniless. Indeed, (2) also
fails to entail (1).
To see this
suppose that on January 15, 1965, the
man just appointed to the Editorship of
Soul does not yet know of his
appointment, and that he has read a
probated will by which an eccentric
businessman bequeathed several millions
to the man who happens to be the Editor
of Soul on that day.
Thus, Privatus'
use of 'he himself' or 'he*' just cannot
be a proxy for 'the Editor of Soul'.
We have seen that when
Privatus asserts "The Editor of Soul
believes that he* is a millionaire",
Privatus' token w of 'he*' is not a proxy
for the description 'The Editor of
More generally, Privatus' token w
Soul'.
of 'he*' is not replaceable by any other
description or name of the Editor of
Soul (or of any other person or things)
which does not include another token w of
he*
when Privatus asserts "The Editor
of Soul believes that he* is a
millionaire", Privatus does not
attribute to the Editor the possession
of any way of referring to himself
aside from his ability to use the
pronoun 'I' or his ability to be
conscious of himself. The latter
ability is the only way of referring to
himself that Privatus must attribute to
the Editor for his statement to be true.
Hence, the statement "The Editor of Soul
believes that he* is a millionaire" does
not entail any statement of the form
"The Editor of Soul
millionaire", where
.

.

.

1

.

.

.

.

'

.

'

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

7

.

-

name or description not containing
tokens w of 'he*'.
Thus, we conclude that the pronoun
•he*' is never replaceable by a name or
a description not containing tokens^ of
.

.

.

'he *'. 17

In The First Person 18 Roderick Chisholm cites

Castaneda's work in discussing 'he himself', but offers

a

variation of Castaneda's example.
The 'he, himself' locution may be
illustrated by an example that Ernst
Mach cites in the second edition of the
He writes: 'Not
Analysis of Sensations
long ago, after a trying railway journey
by night, and much fatigued, I got into
an omnibus, just as another gentleman
"What shabby
appeared at the other end.
pedagogue is that, that has just
It was myself;
entered?" thought I.
opposite me hung a large mirror. The
physiognomy of my class, accordingly,
As
was better known to me than my own.
Mach entered the bus, then, he believed
with respect to Mach and therefore with
respect to himself that he was a shabby
pedagogue, but he did not believe
himself to be a shabby pedagogue. The
experience might have made him say:
But—
'That man is a shabby pedagogue.
prior to his discovery of the mirror it
would not have led him to say: 'I am a
shabby pedagogue '. 19
.

'

—

—

—

Chisholm goes on to comment that "Examples are readily

multiplied."
literature.

And so they are in the philosophical

John Perry writes about mad Heimson who

believes himself to be Hume, Lingrens

lost in the stacks of

a
the Stanford library, and the messy shopper who follows

that
trail of sugar up one aisle and down the next, unaware

he himself is the messy shopper.

David Lewis describes the

knowing which
case of two Gods, each omniscient, but neither
have in common is a
God he himself is. What all these cases
8

.

thesis about the failure of substitution
of the reflexive
pronoun 'he himself', when this expression
occurs embedded
behind a propositional attitude verb.

Consider the following two sentences;
Beth Dixon believes that she herself

(1)

is in danger.

(2) Beth Dixon believes that T is in
danger (where *T' is to be replaced by
any singular term denoting Beth Dixon
that contains no occurrence of 'she
herself
'

Sentence
(2)

(1)

)

attributes

a de se

belief to Beth Dixon, while

attributes to Beth Dixon either a de re or de dicto

belief.
Suppose, in the first case, that we read sentence

(2)

as the attribution of a de dicto belief by replacing 'T'
(2)

with the description 'the philosopher married to Mark

Holden', which actually denotes me.
(1)

to be true and

(2)

to be false,

Then it is possible for
if,

for example,

suffer from amnesia and fail to believe that

philosopher married to Mark Holden.
replacement of

'T'

in

(2)

I

am the

I

Furthermore, for any

by a description uniquely

referring to Beth Dixon, it will always be possible for
and

(2)

Hence,

(1)

and

do not mean the same thing and fail to attribute to me

the same belief.
(1),

(1)

to differ in truth-value; though we may need to vary

the stories that make these cases plausible.
(2)

in

These facts have been taken to show that

and other de se attributions of belief, are not

reducible to the logical form of sentences that purport to
make de dicto attributions of belief, as in
9

(2)

.

.

,

Sentence

attributes to me
in danger.

may also be read in such a way that it

(2)

a de re

belief of Beth Dixon, that she is

This reading may be represented as:
(3) T is such that Beth Dixon believes
of T that she is in danger.

When

is construed as the de re belief in (3)

(2)

reasons for thinking that
the meaning of

reflection in

(1)

a

of the woman

But

true.

a

I

see,

At this time

shows that my belief in
Hence, when 'T' in

(3)

may form a belief

I

Hence,

(3)

am in danger, so

The difference in truth-values of sentences

false.
(3)

I

that she is in danger.

fail to believe that

I

I

hatchet creeping up slowly behind

am watching.

I

am observing my own

I

mirror, but fail to recognize myself.

observe a maniac with
the woman

does not adeguately capture

(3)

Suppose

.

there are

(1)

(3)

is

(1)
(1)

is

and

cannot be represented by

is replaced by some non-

indexical singular term denoting me, then it is possible

that

(1)

entails (3), but

(3)

does not entail (l). 20

Together these examples are designed to show that the
representation in

(1)

cannot be reduced to the logical form

of sentences that make attributions of either de dicto or de
re belief.
in

(1)

The explanation for this is that 'she herself'

cannot be replaced by some co-referential name,

description, or demonstrative pronoun that does not contain
an occurrence of 'she herself', while preserving the truth-

value of

(1)

.

Many of the philosophers

I

discuss throughout

is not
the dissertation rely on the claim that 'she herself'

replacable in these contexts.
10

In later chapters

I

refer to

the failure of substitution of 'she herself'
in belief

contexts as the

'

Irreplacability Thesis', or (IT).

Because it has been thought that (IT) is true
only for
oblique contexts created by propositional attitude
verbs
like 'believes',

'knows',

'fears', etc., each of the views

discussed in Chapters Two-Seven assumes some particular
analysis of propositional attitude sentence constructions.
I

so

take 'believes' to be paradigmatic of this sentence type,
I

restrict my attention to how sentences of the form

believes that

S

are to be analyzed, where

'a'

a

is replaced

by some singular term denoting an individual, and

is

'S'

replaced by any sentence.
In Chapters Two-Five
a

I

examine the view that belief is

two-place relation between a believer and the proposition

expressed by a sentence.

The philosophers who advance such

an analysis include Norman Kretzman, Patrick Grim, H.N.

Castaneda, R. Chisholm
Evans.

(

Person and Object

s

,

and Gareth

Each offers an analysis of belief where the

proposition believed is a first-person proposition.

Such

propositions are expressed by indexical sentences containing
'I',

and can be believed, known, etc., only by the speakers

of those sentences.

Because there are difficulties

associated with construing first-person propositions as
sentence meanings and objects of thought,

I

go on to seek an

alternative to the accounts of self-attribution discussed in
Chapters Two-Five.

11

John Perry's proposal that belief is analyzed as
three— place relation between

expressed by

a

a

a

believer, a proposition

sentence, and a "belief state" offers some

initial optimism for avoiding first-person propositions.
But Perry's view suffers from a difficulty about how to

individuate belief states.
In Chapter Seven

I

consider another way to avoid

privileged access by examining the view that belief is

a

two-place relation between

I

a

believer and

a

property.

discuss the details of Roderick Chisholm's theory in The
First Person
David Lewis.

,

as well as a similar account presented by

While privileged access is not

a

problem for

property theories, there are other reasons for rejecting
these specific proposals.
My project here is to explain how and why privileged

access emerges from some analyses of first-person indexical
belief.

I

argue that inaccessible propositions and beliefs

raise more problems than they solve.

For this reason, the

analyses of belief that lead to inaccessibility should be
avoided, if possible.

In the conclusion

I

speculate about

the prognosis for formulating an adequate account of de se

belief that does not entail privileged access.

12
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CHAPTER

2

FIRST-PERSON PROPOSITIONS

Introduction
In this chapter

I

identify what

I

take to be the Basic

Argument for the introduction of first-person propositions.
There are two versions of this argument

— one

offered by

Norman Kretzmann in his article "Omniscience and
Immutability," 1 and the other by Patrick Grim from "Against
Omniscience: The Case from Essential Indexicals

.

2

An

examination of these two versions of the Basic Argument
allows us to formulate a definition of

a

first-person

proposition, and to see what consequences follow from

accepting their existence.

chapter

I

In the conclusion of this

argue that first-person propositions force us to

diverge from the traditional conception of

a

proposition

when these are construed as sentence meanings and as the
objects of thought.

For this reason,

I

recommend a search

for more compelling arguments for introducing first-person

propositions into our ontology.

The Basic Argument
In the concluding section of "Omniscience and

Immutability" Norman Kretzmann makes use of certain facts
about indexicality to argue that omniscience is incompatible

with theism.

The argument Kretzmann offers here is of

interest because it seems to rely on the thesis that there
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s

are propositions that only one person can grasp.

Here is

the relevant passage by Kretzmann:

Consider these two statements.
(51) Jones knows that he
[himself] is in the hospital.
Jones knows that Jones is
(52
in the hospital.
SI and S2 are logically independent.
It
may be that Jones is an amnesia case.
He knows perfectly well that he is in a
hospital, and after reading the morning
papers he knows that Jones is in the
hospital.
An omniscient being surely
must know all that Jones knows. Anyone
can know what S2 describes Jones as
knowing, but no one other than Jones can
know what SI describes Jones as knowing.
(A case in point: Anyone could have
proved that Descartes existed, but that
is not what Descartes proved in the
Cogito, and what he proved in the Cogito
could not have been proved by anyone
The kind of knowledge SI
else.)
ascribes to Jones is, moreover, the kind
of knowledge characteristic of every
self-conscious entity, of every person.
Every person knows certain propositions
that no other person can know.
Therefore, if God is omniscient, theism
is false, and if theism is true, God is
not omniscient. 3
)

Kretzmann is arguing here that theism in incompatible

with an omniscient God.

The theological conclusion may

interest us because it appears to depend on Kretzmann'

claim that "Every person knows certain propositions that no
other person can know."

This remark suggests that Kretzmann

but if so,
is arguing for some version of privileged access,

the reasoning is unclear.

In what follows

I

construct an

makes here,
argument, consistent with other remarks Kretmann

been led to claim
in order to clarify why Kretzmann may have

16

that "Every person knows certain propositions
that no other
person can know."

Kretzmann begins this passage by stating that
(S2

)

are logically independent.

(SI)

and

The example he cites is

evidence for this claim if we reason in the
following way.
If Jones has amnesia, then it is possible
that he

fails to

know he himself is Jones.

Therefore, it is possible for

Jones to know that he himself is in the hospital while
failing to know that Jones is in the hospital.

possible for (SI) to be true while

(S2)

So,

it is

is false.

Alternatively, Jones may read in the morning paper that

person named 'Jones' is in the hospital.

a

From this he may

know that Jones is in the hospital, but since he does not

know that he himself is Jones, he fails to realize he

himself is in the hospital.

(In this case we suppose that

Jones does not recognize the hospital surroundings.)
latter case is one where (S2) is true while

(SI)

This

is false.

Kretzmann goes on to claim that "Anyone can know what
(

S2

)

describes Jones as knowing, but no one other than Jones

can know what (SI) describes Jones as knowing."

premise does not follow just from the fact that
(S2

)

are logically independent.

This
(SI)

and

Kretzmann suggests that the

kind of knowledge ascribed to Jones in (SI) is

characteristic of every self-conscious entity, and he cites
what Descartes proved by the Cogito as a case of this kind
of knowledge.

Maybe Kretzmann 's reference to Descartes can

be explained in the following way.

17

Descartes knew that

'I

:

.

exist' was true when uttered or conceived by Descartes

himself.

Analogously, what Jones knows in (SI) can be

specified by Jones, himself, uttering or conceiving
the hospital

am in

'I

'

The analogy to Descartes has obvious limitations.

Surely Kretzmann does not want to maintain that Jones can

prove what Jones would express by

'

I

am in the hospital' in

the same way that Descartes proved what he expressed by

'I

exist' as this occurs in the Coqito passage of The

Meditations
'I

Descartes could not have used an utterance of

.

am in the hospital' as the first principle about which he

could be absolutely certain.

Perhaps Kretzmann is

interested in showing that the cases are alike insofar as
both Descartes and Jones can report on what they know by

using the indexical 'I'.

In a footnote Kretzmann credits

Castaneda for observations he makes in the article "'He': A
Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness

.

Here, Castaneda

says

when Privatus asserts 'the Editor
of Soul believes that he* is a
millionaire', Privatus does not
attribute to the Editor the possession
of any way of referring to himself
aside from his ability to use the
pronoun 'I' or his ability to be
conscious of himself 5
.

.

.

.

By citing this passage, Kretzmann may be offering some

justification for redescribing what Jones knows in
the proposition expressed by Jones's utterance of
the hospital'.
in

(SI)

(SI)
'

I

as

am in

But even if we redescribe what Jones knows

as the proposition expressed by Jones's utterance of
18

.

•I

am in the hospital

.

',

it is still not clear why Kretzmann

claims no one but Jones can know this
proposition.
One way of understanding Kretzmann 's comment
is to

suppose that he is making implicit use of the

Irreplacability Thesis discussed in Chapter One.

This

thesis says that when 'he himself' is embedded behind
a

propositional attitude verb, co-referential substitutions
for this expression may fail.

Specifically,

For some name or description 'T' that
refers to Jones (not containing an
occurrence of 'he himself'), it is
possible that (1) and (2) differ in
truth-value.
(1) Jones knows that he himself is in
the hospital.
(2) Jones knows that T is in the
hospital

Following Castaneda, we might infer from the failure of

substitution of 'he himself' in (SI), that

(SI)

does not

attribute to Jones some way of referring to himself aside
from his ability to use the pronoun 'I'.

Kretzmann speaks about propositions being the "objects
of knowledge," 6 so there is evidence to indicate he would

accept the claim that:
Belief and knowledge, and other
propositional attitudes, are two-place
relations between an individual and a
proposition
For example, if Max believes that ketchup is a vegetable,

then Max is related to the proposition expressed by 'ketchup
is a vegetable'.
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.

If it is possible for Jones to know the
proposition

expressed by his utterance of

'

I

am in the hospital' but

know the proposition expressed by
hospital^, where

'T'

^

T is in the

is some non-indexical name or

description referring to Jones, then the proposition
expressed by

'

I

am in the hospital' as uttered by Jones is

not identical to the proposition expressed by
1
hospital in (2)

T is in the

This still does not allow us to infer that only Jones
can know the proposition expressed by Jones's utterance of
'I

am in the hospital

'

,

unless we suppose that the

Irreplacability Thesis can be extended to sentences uttered
by individuals other than Jones.
(IT)

implies that the expression

utterance of

'

I

am in the hospital

'

'I'

in Jones's

cannot be replaced by

some name, description, or demonstrative pronoun referring
to Jones, because no other singular term will guarantee that

Jones knowingly identifies himself.

Jones may not know that

he is referring to himself when he uses the name 'Jones', or
if he uses

himself.

'you' when pointing to a mirror reflection of

The same kind of mistake that Jones makes when

using the name 'Jones' or 'you' may also arise when
individuals other than Jones use these expressions to refer
to Jones.

Mary may utter 'You are in the hospital' and fail

to know that she has referred to Jones.

Perhaps the person

she points to is wrapped in bandages and she mistakes Jones
for someone else.

Since it is possible that Jones, as well

20

,

,

as Mary, may be wrong about the identity of
the person

refered to by 'you', we might infer that the
proposition

Jones knows when he utters

'I

am in the hospital',

is not

identical to the proposition Mary knows when she utters
'You
are in the hospital', while actually pointing to
Jones.

More generally, the proposition expressed by Jones's

utterance of

'

I

am in the hospital' is not identical to the

proposition expressed by r T is in the hospital 1 in
where

'T'

is replaced by some name,

(3)

description, or

demonstrative pronoun referring to Jones, not containing

a

first-person indexical.
(3)

Mary knows that T is in the hospital.

the proposition Jones knows in (SI) can be expressed in

So,

oratio recta only by the indexical sentence

'I

am in the

hospital' as said by Jones.

Furthermore, only Jones can use the indexical sentence
'I

am in the hospital' to express the very proposition that

Jones knows in (SI) since, only Jones can use the indexical
'I'

to make reference to himself.

This grammatical

restraint on the indexical reference of 'I', together with
the claim that no other proposition is identical to what

Jones knows in (SI)
(SI)

suggests that "only Jones can know what
For this to be so, we

describes Jones as knowing."

must make the additional assumption that

proposition only if they can use
that proposition.

a

a

person knows a

sentence that expresses

For example, since Mary cannot use

'I'

assert that Jones is in the hospital, she cannot know the
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to

.

proposition expressed by Jones's utterance of
hospital

'

I

am in the

'

According to this way of reasoning, the proposition
Jones knows in (SI) is a first-person proposition.

argument for first-person propositions sketched here
refer to as the 'Basic Argument'.

The
I

will

It goes quite beyond what

Kretzmann explicitly commits himself to in the passage
quoted earlier.
I

Nevertheless, appealing to this reasoning,

maintain, is the best explanation for why Kretzmann claims

that "Every person knows certain propositions that no other

person can know."

Regardless of whether Kretzmann is so committed, the
following characterization of first-person propositions

begins to emerge:
(a) First-person propositions are those
propositions that are expressed by the
use of indexical sentences containing
'I', or any first-person pronoun.

Furthermore, no one but Jones can have as an object of

knowledge the proposition expressed by
hospital' as uttered by Jones.

'

I

am in the

Another way of stating this

is to say:
(b) First-person propositions are
private to the speakers of indexical
sentences containing 'I', or any firstperson pronoun.

The intelligibility of

(b)

depends partly on clarifying

the sense of 'private' as it occurs here.

Specifically, we

can define a First-Person Proposition (FP) relative to an

individual and a context as follows:
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(FP)
is a first-person proposition
relative to an individual S and a
context c, where S is the agent in c, if
and only if
^ P) [P is an indexical
sentence containing 'I', or any firstperson pronoun, such that:
(i)
'I' refers to S in c; and
(ii)
P expresses
relative to c; and
(iii) <> (S believes jrfj
and
(iv)
(S* / S -> S* does not
D (V S*)
7
believe JZf)
(

;

]

.

The class of first-person propositions includes more than

those propositions that are the objects of belief.

replace 'believes' in clause (iii) and

(iv)

We can

of (FP) with a

variable that ranges over any psychological verb to get the
more general principle that

0

cannot be an object of a

psychological attitude for anyone but

S. 8

If there are

first-person propositions, then for any person who utters

a

first-person indexical sentence, and believes what they say,
there is a first-person proposition expressed by that

sentence that is the object of belief only for the
individual referred to by 'I'.

According to (FP)

necessity, no one but the referent of

'I'

In this sense,

first-person propositions.

,

of

can believe these

first-person

propositions are 'inaccessible' to all but the agents of
first-person indexical sentences.
The success of the Basic Argument depends on two

important assumptions.

First, the assumption that the

Irreplacability Thesis is true, and that we can use this
thesis to infer that

a

first-person proposition is not

identical to a proposition expressed by a sentence not

containing a first-person indexical

23

— regardless

of who

"

"

utters such a sentence.

Second, the assumption that belief

and knowledge, and other propositional
attitudes, can be
analyzed as two-place relations between
an individual and a
proposition. However, even if one accepts
these

assumptions, there is still reason for
doubting the
conclusion that first-person propositions exist.
Castaneda,
for one, accepts the Irreplacability Thesis,
as well
as the

claim that belief is a two-place relation, but
rejects

Kretzmann's conclusion that only one person can know
the

proposition expressed by
I

a

first-person indexical sentence.

discuss Castaneda's reply to Kretzmann in Chapter Three.

Another Version of the Basic Argument
In an article by Patrick Grim,

The Case from Essential Indexicals

,

"Against Omniscience:
9

we find another

argument for first-person propositions that resembles the
Basic Argument.

In fact, by Grim's own description, he is

advancing a slightly different version of Kretzmann's
argument against the possibility of an omniscient God.

Like

Kretzmann, Grim also relies on showing that first-person

propositions exist to establish the more general theological
conclusion.

It is this first step in Grim's reasoning that

interests us primarily.

Grim considers this example from

Perry's article, "The Problem of the Essential
Indexical

.

10
I follow a trail of spilled sugar around
and around a tall aisle in the
supermarket, in search of the shopper
who is making a mess. Suddenly I
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.

:

,

.

,

.

realize that the trail of sugar that I
have been following is spilling from a
torn sack in my cart, and that I am the
culprit I am making a mess. 11

—

Grim argues in the following way.

know in

(4)

by what

I

is not the same,

believe or know in

What

believe or

I

and cannot be fully explained
(5)

am making a mess.

(4)

I

(5)

Patrick Grim is making a mess.

Grim says:
In order to give a realization on my
part that Patrick Grim is making a mess
the full explanatory force of my
realization that I am making a mess, in
fact, we would have to add that I know
that I am Patrick Grim. And that, of
course, is to reintroduce the
indexical 12

Grim might also have appealed to the Irreplacability
Thesis to argue that Grim's utterance of

expresses a

(4)

different proposition than the proposition expressed by

(5)

That is, if it is possible for Grim to believe or know the

proposition expressed by his utterance of

(4)

believe the proposition expressed by

then

(5)

but fail to
(4)

and

(5)

do not express the same proposition.

What is known or expressed in terms of
that I am making a mess is
[4], then
not merely what is known or expressed
without the indexical in terms of [5]. 13

—

—

In order to establish that what Grim believes or knows
in

(4)

cannot be believed or known by anyone else, we need

to consider the case where some individual other than Grim

believes or knows what is expressed by

25

(5)

Grim says:

.

A being distinct from me could, of
course, know [5].
But as argued
above, this does not amount to what
know in knowing [4]. 14
.

.

I

Grim appears to assume here that beings can believe or know
only the propositions that they can, themselves, express by

sentences

.

Since a being distinct from Grim cannot use the

indexical sentence in

(4)

to assert a proposition about Grim

making a mess, she cannot know that proposition.
Moreover, a being distinct from Grim might believe or
know:
(6)

He is making a mess.

But what is believed or known in

believes or knows in

(4)

(6)

is not what Grim

Following Perry, Grim argues for

this claim by introducing a mirror example of the sort we

have discussed in Chapter One.
For consider a case in which I see
myself and my messy trail of sugar in a
fish-eye mirror at the end of the aisle.
I might then come to believe [6] de re
of the man in the mirror of myself, as
it happens
just as anyone else might
But I
come to believe [6] de re of me.
would not thereby know what I know in
knowing [4], for I still might not
realize that it is me in the mirror. A
knowledge de re of me and my mess, then,
still falls short of what I know in
knowing [4] de se. 15

—

—

Grim is arguing here that if anyone were to formulate the de
re belief about Grim by using sentence (6), they would not

express the same proposition as the proposition expressed by

Grim's utterance of (4).

As Grim puts it,

'I'

"essential" to what Grim believes or knows.

that

I
'

'

in (4)

cannot be eliminated from
26

(4)

in

(4)

is

This is to say

without

.

changing the truth value of
I

(4)

No sentence not containing

or 'he himself' expresses the same proposition
that Grim

believes or knows in (4).

The rest of the argument for the

theological conclusion proceeds as follows.
But what I know in such a case, it
appears, is known by no omniscient
being.
The indexical 'I', as argued
above, is essential to what I know in
knowing [4].
But only I can use that
'I' to index me
no being distinct from
me can do so.
I am not omniscient.
But
there is something that I know that no
being distinct from me can know.
Neither I nor any being distinct from
me, then, is omniscient:
there is no
omniscient being. 16

—

There are several obvious difficulties with this
argument.

First, Grim seems to require that God's capacity

for knowing depends on linguistic assertion.

The fact that

an omniscient being cannot use a sentence to express the

proposition expressed by

(4)

does not necessarily mean he

cannot know this proposition, unless we also assume that in
order to know a proposition an omniscient being must be able
to assert a sentence that expresses it.

making this latter assumption.

I

see no reason for

It is no more plausible to

suppose that a less than omniscient being other than Grim
can know the proposition Grim knows, expressed by Grim's

utterance of (4), since this conclusion also depends on the
claim that in order to know a proposition a person must be
able to assert a sentence that expresses that proposition.
Still, even if we grant Grim this assumption, Grim's

argument for propositions that only one person can know,
does not square with

a

whole range of cases involving third
27

person attributions of knowledge.

Consider

a

sentence like

the following:
(7)

Mary knows that

I

am making a mess.

According to Grim, the embedded clause in

(7)

'

am making a

I

mess', expresses a proposition that can be known only
by the

referent of

'I'

— in

this case, Beth Dixon.

But

(7)

attributes to Mary knowledge of this first-person
proposition.

If sentences like

(7)

are not counter-examples

to the view that only one person can know a first-person

proposition, then there must be some alternative account

explaining these third person attributions of knowledge.

No

such explanation is provided by Grim in his discussion of

indexical sentences.
However, we can speculate about what Grim should say

regarding

(7)

occurrence of

and sentences of this form.
'I'

in

(7)

The embedded

can be replaced salva veritate by

some name or description referring to Beth Dixon.

sentence like

(7)

In a

the subordinate clause does not express

the "thought content" attributed to Mary.

Since Mary cannot

refer to Dixon using 'I', she must have some other way of

making reference to Dixon that is not revealed by sentence
(7).

To represent what Mary knows in

(7)

we can replace

'I'

with Mary's way of referring to Beth Dixon.
Since Grim does not extend his analysis of indexical

sentences to explain third person attributions of knowledge
and belief, it is difficult to assess his view that

believing a sentence containing
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a

first-person indexical

.

reference involves believing

a

first-person proposition.

The view that sentences containing

'I'

express such

propositions appears false when faced with sentence

and

(7)

others of this same form.

Problems for First-Person Propositions
Even if we accept the reasoning that constitutes the

Basic Argument for the existence of first-person

propositions, we may still be reluctant to admit such

entities into our ontology.

In this section

I

argue that

accepting the existence of first-person propositions forces
us to diverge from the traditional conception of what a

proposition is.

To this end, it is useful to see how some

philosophers have characterized propositions in general.
Propositions have been traditionally regarded as the

bearers of truth-values, or the entities that are timelessly
true or false. 17

Moreover, it is often claimed that a

proposition is true or false in virtue of the way the world
is.

Consider the following sentences:
(8)

Beth Dixon is tired at 4:36 on July

17,

1987.

I am tired at 4:36 on July 17, 1987
(uttered by Beth Dixon)

(9)

The proposition expressed by sentence

(8)

is true if it is

the case that Beth Dixon is tired at the time specified, and
false otherwise.

Likewise, sentence

(9)

is true if it is

the case that Beth Dixon is tired at the time specified,

since Beth Dixon is the person referred to by
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in

(9).

,

Exactly the same conditions make both

(8)

and

true.

(9)

Both sentences express a proposition about
the same person,
and attribute the same property to that
person.
For this
reason, we are naturally led to suppose that
the

propositions expressed by

(8)

and

are the same.

(9)

This way of individuating propositions is not

consistent with our supposing that

a

first-person

proposition is expressed by sentence (9).
a

Suppose belief is

two-place relation between an individual and

Proposition, and

I,

a

Beth Dixon, believe the proposition

expressed by sentence (9).

Call this proposition

a

first-person proposition relative to Beth Dixon.

consider the case where

Now

is uttered by another person,

(8)

Call the proposition expressed by (9),

'

^

.

If S believes

what she says, then

S

for S to believe $

according to condition (iv) of

This means that
p and

believes

Y

.

S.

But it is not possible
(FP)

.

are not identical, even though the

very same conditions that make

(jl

true, also make

Y

true.

This result is contrary to the intuitive explanation of what

makes these propositions true or false.

Another standard way of characterizing propositions is
to identify these with the meanings of sentences.
Moore,
a

G.E.

for example, says that a proposition is expressed by

collection of words. 18

This suggests that propositions

are the contents of what is said when a person utters a

sentence, or that a proposition is the statement expressed
by a particular occurrence of a sentence.
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Alonzo Church, in

.

his article "Propositions and Sentences, "19
characterizes
propositions in the following way:
A proposition is an abstract entity
expressed by a declarative sentence, and
is
the content of meaning which is
common to the sentence and its
translation into other languages. 20
.

.

.

According to this conception,

a

proposition is the meaning

of the words expressed by a declarative
sentence.

Ordinarily, we believe that if a sentence is uttered
on
two different occasions by the same person, or by two
^ lllerGnl:

<

people, the sentence uttered has the same meaning

on both occasions.

For example, if sentence

is uttered

(8)

by Beth Dixon, and at some later time by another person
and

utter sentences that mean the same thing.

I

S,

If

propositions are identified with the meanings of sentences,
then

S

and

I

utterances of

express the same proposition by our respective
(8)

Indexical sentences pose a difficulty for this

particular criterion of synonymy.
uttered by Beth Dixon and also by

If sentence
S,

(9)

is

there is reason to

suppose that these respective utterances do not have the
same meaning, since what

I

say is true, while what S says

may be false. 21
First-person propositions are consistent with this way
of individuating the meanings of indexical sentences.

there are first-person propositions, then

S

and

I

If

express

different first-person propositions by our respective

utterances of

'I

am tired at 4:36 on July 17, 1987'.
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The

S

s

.

proposition expressed by my utterance of this
sentence can
be known only by me, and the proposition
expressed
by S

utterance of this sentence can be known only
by

S.

'

Because

it is possible for me to know my first-person
proposition,

but not S's, these propositions must be different.

if we

identify propositions with the meanings of sentences,
this
result is consistent with the claim that the meaning

of an

indexical sentence changes relative to the context of

utterance
However, there is still a sense of 'same meaning'

whereby S and

I

do utter sentences with the same meaning

when we both utter the indexical sentence
4:36 on July 17, 1987'.

'I

am tired at

We do utter the same syntactic

string, and the same linguistic rules apply to both

utterances.

If the meaning of a sentence is identified with

the linguistic conventions or public rules for using and

understanding language, then

S

and

I

utter sentences that

have the same meaning--we make the same assertion, though
this assertion is about different people.

It is this sense

of 'meaning' that might be invoked to explain how

communication between language users takes place.
a

There is

plausible assumption about how understanding and

communication occur between users of

a

language: In order

for communication to be successful between speakers and

hearers, the hearer must grasp the meaning of the sentence

that the speaker utters.

32

If first-person propositions are the meanings of

indexical sentences in the sense just described, it is

difficult to see how this theory of communication could be
true

Since only

.

can be related to, or entertain, the

I

first-person proposition that is the meaning of the
indexical sentence

I

utter, this may imply that other

speakers do not understand what

I

mean when

utter an

I

indexical sentence.
One solution to this difficulty may be to reject the

particular theory of communication just mentioned.

It is

still the case, however, that if first-person propositions
exist, S cannot assert a sentence that expresses the same

proposition as the indexical sentence

I

utter.

This is a

significant departure from the conception of linguistic

meaning described above.

A traditional account of sentence

meanings has it that these meanings exist in
domain

— every

a

public

linguistic meaning accessible to every

individual capable of using and understanding the language.
If we admit first-person propositions into our ontology and

accept some version of the claim that propositions are the

meanings of sentences, then we must relinquish the idea
that sentence meanings are public.

This result seems

contrary to our intuitions about the nature of linguistic

meaning and the relation between meaning and communication.
The standard conception of a proposition also includes

characterizing these entities as objects of thought.

The

psychological account of propositions has it that they are

33

what is believed, known, feared, or entertained by
individuals.

This being so, we need to say something

further about how well first-person propositions

characterize the psychological states of individuals.
To say that propositions are the objects of thought

does not decide the issue of whether they are subjective or

objective entities.

If Mary utters

'I

am hungry' and

believes what she says, then what Mary believes is the

proposition expressed by her utterance of

'

I

am hungry'.

What Mary believes may be either a subjective entity

— part

of the content of Mary's consciousness, or an objective

entity that exists independently of Mary's mind, but is in
some way related to Mary's mind

— perhaps

Mary "grasps" this

proposition by thinking about it.
Gottlob Frege argues that propositions or thoughts must
be objective, rather than subjective entities.

In "The

Thought " 22 Frege takes pains to distinguish propositions
from ideas, which he associates with the "inner world of

sense-impressions,

inclinations

.

.

.

," 23

.

.

feelings and moods

...

a world of

Since condition (iv) of (FP) requires

that first-person propositions be private to the agent

referred to by 'I', this suggests that first-person
propositions, if they exist, may be more like Frege's

world" of ideas, than objective entities.

'

inner

Since

propositions have been traditionally understood to exist
objectively and independently of minds, rather than as the
contents of a particular consciousness, there is already

34

a

suspicion that first-person propositions give us the wrong

characterization of thought content.

For the present time

withhold judgment about how well first-person propositions
characterize the psychological states of individuals until
specific proposals can be discussed in later chapters.
Because first-person propositions force us to diverge

somewhat from the traditional conception of

a

proposition,

and interfere with the role we expect propositions to play
as sentence meanings and objects of thought, we may be

reluctant to admit these propositions into our ontology.
For this reason

I

devote the next three chapters to

examining alternative accounts of self-attribution that
preserve the principle that 'believes' and other

propositional attitude verbs are two-place relations

between an individual and

a

proposition.
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CHAPTER

3

FIRST-PERSON PROPOSITIONAL GUISES

Introduction
In this chapter

I

examine Castaneda's challenge to

Kretzmann's version of the Basic Argument.

Castaneda

attempts to show that more than one person can know the

proposition expressed by an indexical sentence.

I

explain

how he is forced to revise his reply to Kretzmann and
commits himself to the existence of first-person

propositional guises that only the speakers of first-person
indexical sentences can entertain.

I

show here that the

introduction of propositional guises as the objects of

belief and knowledge is no advantage over first-person
Castaneda individuates first-person

propositions.

propositional guises too narrowly for these to play

a

satisfactory role in attributions of belief and explanations
of behavior.

Castaneda's Reply

Replying to Kretzmann, Castaneda argues that an

omniscient God and any finite being can believe, know, or
consider a proposition that makes a first-person indexical
reference

1

Consider again Kretzmann's example about Jones.
Jones knows that he (himself) is in
hospital.
the
Jones knows that Jones is in the
52
hospital
(51)
(

)

38

:

'

Castaneda is committed to defending at least part of

Kretzmann's reasoning about

(SI)

and (S2).

He has

persuasively argued in various publications that the
indicator,

'I',

is never replacable by a name or description

not containing tokens of

'

1'.^

Hence, Castaneda appears to

accept the truth of the Irreplacability Thesis.-*

But

according to Castaneda, the occurrence of the indexical

'I'

can be eliminated by another person in favor of a "quasi-

indicator".

About quasi-indicators, Castaneda says:

I call quasi- indicators the expressions
which in oratio obliqua represent uses,
perhaps only implicit, of indicators
[the personal and demonstrative pronouns
and adverbs like 'this', 'that', 'I',
•you', 'here', 'there', and 'now'] i.e.,
uses which are ascribed to some person
or persons by means of a cognitive or
linguistic verb. 4

For example, if Jones knows what he would express by
am in the hospital', we can describe what Jones knows by

making use of the quasi-indicator 'he himself', as in
sentence (SI)

.

But this quasi-indicator is the only

linguistic expression that preserves the full force of

Jones's utterance.

5

Nevertheless, from this Castaneda

insists it does not follow (as Kretzmann supposes) that no
one but Jones can know the proposition attributed to Jones
in (SI)

.

To show this, Castaneda relies on the following

principle
(P)

If a sentence of the form 'X knows

that a person Y knows that
formulates a true statement, then the
person X knows the statement formulated
6
by the clause filling the blank '...'.
.

39
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'I

"

.

Castaneda here uses 'statement' and 'proposition'
interchangeably.

7

So

(P)

is a principle about the

transitivity of knowledge of propositions.

This principle

deserves careful scrutiny, since it functions as the frontline of defense against Kretzmann's argument.

Already one's

suspicions are aroused by Castaneda's qualifying remarks

concerning

Castaneda warns that

(P)

detachment of expressions such as

'X

(P)

does not license

knows that ...'.

particular, he wants to guard against using

(P)

8

in

to make

invalid inferences when the embedded clause represented by
'

.

.

.

'

in

(P)

contains

a

quasi-indicator.

For example,

consider the following sentence:
(1) Mary knows that George knows that he
himself is in pain.

Principle

(P)

does not entitle us to infer that:

(2)

Mary knows that he himself is in

pain.

The reason, Castaneda says, is that "there is no such
proposition.

9

What Castaneda probably means when he says that
does not express
'he himself'

in

a
(1)

proposition is this:

(2)

The reference of

depends on the reference of the

antecedent name 'George'.

In this sense quasi-indicators

are referentially and syntactically dependent on their

antecedents. 10

But when 'he himself is in pain' is detached

from the entire clause 'George knows that he himself is in
pain', as it is in (2), then 'he himself' in

successfully refer to George.

40

Hence,

(2)

(2)

cannot

cannot express a

.

proposition about George's being in pain.
himself' in

And, since 'he

is not syntactically the right indicator to

(2)

refer to Mary,

(2)

cannot express a proposition about Mary

being in pain. 11
However, as Castaneda explains,

(P)

and

(1)

together do

imply that Mary and George know the very same proposition

about George's being in pain.

1^

This suggests that

Castaneda leaves us with no way of expressing in oratio
recta what Mary knows, provided

(P)

is true.

It will not do

to say Mary knows of George that he is in pain, since by the

Basic Argument, George may fail to know that George, or he
(while demonstrating a mirror image of himself)

is in pain.

The closest approximation we can make is to specify what

George knows in oratio recta

attribution of
(4)

(3)

.

What George knows in the

can be expressed by George's statement in

:

(3)

George knows that he himself is in

pain.
(4)

I

am in pain.

In correspondence with Robert Adams, 13 Castaneda

describes the relation between sentences of the form of
and

(4)

(3)

by making explicit a principle he claims to have

assumed throughout his earlier writing and discussions of
the 'he himself' locution.
degree
(Q) A quasi-indexical clause of
one expresses in its oratio recta
context the identical proposition that a
corresponding indexical sentence paired
with a certain context of utterance
expresses 14

41
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,

Principle

is apparently operating implicitly in

(Q)

Castaneda's reply to Kretzmann.

Castaneda says:

The statement that Jones knows by [SI]
is one that Jones would express by
saying 'I am in the hospital '. 15

Furthermore, if a person other than Jones, call him
'a',

knows that Jones knows that he himself is in the

hospital, then by principle

(P)

knows the proposition

a

expressed by 'he himself is in the hospital' in (SI).
by

(Q)

/

Since

the proposition expressed by 'he himself is in the

hospital' in (SI) is the very same proposition that is

expressed by Jones's assertion of

'

I

am in the hospital', it

is possible for a to know the proposition expressed by

Jones's first-person indexical reference.
Kretzmann 's argument that omniscience is incompatible

with theism depends on the claim that the propositions

expressed by sentences containing a first-person indexical
reference can be known by only one person.

Hence,

Castaneda's concluding remark:
.

.

.

route,

omniscience is not, by the
incompatible with theism 1
.

If Castaneda is correct, then there are no first-person

propositions

— propositions

expressed by first-person

indexical sentences that can be known by only one person.
But Castaneda himself concedes his reasoning is not

conclusive by renouncing the principle we have stated as
(Q)

Castaneda says:

Consider Tiresia's 'I am the blind
I used to hold that it is
Tiresias'
identical to the statement anybody can
.

42
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)

formulate with the clause 'he himself is
the blind Tiresias' as part of the
statement 'Tiresias believes that he
himself is the blind Tiresias'. Perry
chides me for this error. He remarks,
correctly, that jettisoning that
erroneous claim weakens my argument
against Norman Kretzmann about
omniscience.
(But the weakening is not
fatal. 17

Castaneda explains that the reassessment of his own position
was brought about by several counter-examples introduced by

Rogers Albritton and Robert Adams.

In the next section,

I

examine the counter-example that apparently led Castaneda to
reject

(Q)

The rejection of

(Q)

ultimately commits

Castaneda to inaccessible first-person propositional guises.

The Adams-Castaneda Correspondence
In this section

I

argue that Robert Adams fails to

formulate a successful counter-example to Castaneda's

principle (P). 18

I

consider another version of this example

with appropriate revisions by Patrick Grim, and

I

conclude

that Grim's example does show that there is a problem with

Castaneda's reply to Kretzmann.
Robert Adams initially attempts to show that

Castaneda's principle
(P)

(P)

is implausible.

Adams formulates

in the following way:
(P.l)

If A knows that B knows that P,

then A knows the proposition expressed
19
by r that P 1 in r B knows that P^
.

Adams claims (P.l) is no more intuitively plausible than
(P.2)

below since,

"...

what makes [P.l] plausible is that

43
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,

the notion of truth enters implicitly into [P.l]
in much the
same way that it enters explicitly into [P.2]." 2 ®
(P.2) If A knows that B is saying truly
that P, then A knows the proposition
expressed by T that P^ in
B is sayinq
truly that P*1 21
'

.

Consider a case where the Editor of Soul is newly

appointed from seven candidates for the position, none of

whom are aware of the recent decision made by the Board of
Directors.

All seven are in the same room together having

just heard the reading of a will bequeathing several million

dollars to the new Editor of Soul

chanting in unison,
true of himself.

'I

.

The candidates are

am rich', each hoping that this is

On the basis of these facts the following

is true:
(5) The Editor of Soul knows that the
Editor of Soul is saying truly that he
himself is rich.

From (P.2) together with (5), it follows that:
(6) The Editor of Soul knows the
proposition expressed by 'he himself is

rich'

in

(5)

Adams suggests that

(6)

is false given the

circumstances described in the example.

In this situation

we have no reason for saying that the Editor of Soul knows
the proposition expressed by 'he himself is rich' in

(5)

since at the time of their utterances all seven candidates
are still ignorant of whom the board has chosen to be the

new Editor.

The falsity of (6), Adams claims, is evidence

that principle (P.2) should be rejected, since this

principle leads to the inference in (6).
44

But if (P.2)

is

.

.

,

.

rejected, this is reason for rejecting (P.l) as well, since
as Adams puts it,

intuitively.

(P.l)

and (P.2)

"seem equally plausible

1,22

The inference from

(5)

to

(6)

is problematic,

opinion, but not for the reasons Adams cites.

in my

What Adams

overlooks is that the embedded occurrence of the definite

description 'the Editor of Soul

'

either as large or small scope.
(5)

in (5)

can be interpreted

Two possible readings of

are:
(5a) (ji x) (x is the Editor of Soul and x
knows that x is saying truly that he
himself is rich)

(5b)
3 x) [x is the Editor of Soul and x
knows that (3 y) (y is the Editor of Soul
and y is saying truly that he himself is
(

rich)

]

Reading (5a) already implies there is an individual,

such

x,

that the Editor of Soul knows of this individual, that he is

saying truly that he himself is rich.

But according to the

example, the Editor fails to know who has been chosen by the

Board of Directors.

So,

the example as described,

Reading

(5b)

if (5)
(5)

is supposed to follow from

cannot be interpreted as (5a)

however, does adequately capture this

ignorance on the part of the Editor.

For (5b) merely

asserts that the Editor knows some one of the candidates in
the room is the Editor of Soul and is saying truly that he

himself is rich.

However, when

it is not clear that

(6)

(5)

is interpreted as

(5b),

follows from (5b) and (P.2).

Specifically, the expression in

(6)

that reads, "the

proposition expressed by 'he himself is rich' in (5)" fails

45

,

.

to denote a unique proposition in the expansion (5b)

there is no specific assignment of value to
The problem with

(6)

that

p"7

'

in

in

since

(5b)

can be traced to (P.2).

to make sense of the expression,

by

'y'

,

.

In order

'the proposition expressed

(P.2), we might revise this principle in

the following way:
(P.2*) If Tx knows that y is saying
truly that P" is true relative to a
context, c, where individual a is
assigned to 'x' and b is assigned to
in c, then a knows 0, where 0 is the
proposition expressed by 'that p' in
1

Once we explicitly assign
P'

i-

n

(P*2*), we see (5b)

a

'y'

c.

unique proposition, 0

to 'that

,

is no longer of the right form to

satisfy the antecedent of (P.2*).

specific assignment to

'y'

in

(5b)

Since there is no

there is no unique

proposition expressed by 'he himself is rich' in

'y is

saying truly that he himself is rich' as this occurs in
(5b)

.

Clearly, this is not the result that Adams intended

when he introduced the counter-example to principle (P.2).
However, we might try to make Adams's critical point by

using a proper name or demonstrative in place of the

embedded definite description 'the Editor of Soul

'

in

(5)

To see whether these technical difficulties can be avoided,
I

borrow a counter-example formulated by Patrick Grim. 23

Grim uses this example against the original formulation of

principles

(P)

and

(Q)

in Castaneda's reply to Kretzmann.

Suppose that mess-making in grocery stores is

a

capital

offense, and detective McQ is the head of a law enforcement
46

.

.

,

,

division assigned to track down and arrest all mess-makers.
McQ receives a message from the FBI that 'Beth Dixon knows
that she herself is making a mess'.

On the basis of this

the following two sentences are true:
(7) Beth Dixon knows that she herself is
making a mess.

(8) McQ knows that Beth Dixon knows that
she herself is making a mess.

Unbeknownst to McQ,

I

am performing messy acts in disguise

at night, and during the day

I

work side by side with McQ

investigating messy shopper crimes under an alias name.
For

to be an instance of Castaneda's original

(8)

principle

(P)

,

we must make particular assignments to the

variables in this principle.

(P)

can be rendered as:

If ^ x knows that y knows that
is true relative to a context c, where a
is assigned to 'x' and b is assigned to
'y' in c, and sentence 'S' expresses a
proposition / in c, then a knows j.
(P*)

If we take the name 'Beth Dixon'

and

in (7)

(8)

to be a

directly referring term and not an abbreviation for some

disguised definite description, then

(8)

From (P*) and

the antecedent of (P*)

is an instance of

(8)

McQ knows the proposition expressed

(9)

by 'she herself is making a mess'
(

8

)

and

(8)

(10)

Dixon
If
(7)

and

f

(Q)

'she herself is making a mess'

is identical to the proposition expressed by:
I

am making a mess (uttered by Beth
24

)

by principle
(8)

in

.

By Castaneda's principle
in (7)

we can infer:

(Q)

'she herself is making a mess'

is identical to the proposition expressed by
47

in

.

then it follows McQ knows the same thing in

(10),

know by (10).

(9)

as I

This result seems contrary to our intuitions

that McQ does not know

I

am making a mess.

"I am safe in my deception."

know the same proposition

I

As Grim puts it,

Evidence that McQ fails to
know in (10) is his failure to

arrest me for mess-making.

Grim uses this example to argue that at least one of

Castaneda's principles, either
seems,

(P*)

or

(Q)

is false.

But it

intuitively, that we want to retain something like

principle

(Q)

,

since it is contrary to our ordinary way of

individuating propositions to count the propositions

expressed by (10), and the embedded clause in

different propositions.

(7)

and

(8)

as

Nevertheless, Castaneda apparently

does not have these intuitions about the plausibility of

(Q)

because he seeks to avoid the apparent problems raised by

Adams's counter-example by relinquishing principle

(Q)

Adams himself suggests that his original counter-

example should be understood as an attack on Castaneda's

principle

January

4,

(Q)

rather than (P.2), and by analogy (P.l).

1980 letter to Castaneda, Adams says:

Reflection on things you say in your
letter, however, has led me to think
that the best way for you to deal with
these problems may not involve rejection
In
of [P.l] and [P.2] after all.
them I
reject
to
ought
you
that
arguing
your
of
part
is
it
that
was assuming
position that, as you put it:
[Q] A quasi-indexical clause
of degree one expresses in its
oratio recta context the
identical proposition that a
corresponding indexical
sentence paired with a
48

In a

,

.

,

certain context of utterance
expresses
And I took it that you understood [Q] to
imply that:
(P*) The proposition expressed
by 'he himself is rich' in
'The Editor of Soul is saying
truly that he himself is
rich
is identically the same as:
(Q*) The proposition the
Editor of Soul would express
by saying, 'I am rich'.
Apart from this assumption my example
does not prove that you ought to reject
[P.2].
It might be taken as showing
rather that the Editor of Soul can know
(P*) without knowing (Q*) 2b
'

.

In his March 16,

1982 reply to Adams, Castaneda

welcomes Adams's attack on
principle. 26

and renounces this

(Q)

Though Castaneda does not have Grim's example

in mind, we can see how such a move blocks the inference

Grim regards as problematic.
from

(8)

We are still entitled to infer

and (P*) that:
(9) McQ knows the proposition expressed
by 'she herself is making a mess' in
(

Yet if

(Q)

8

)

.

is false, the proposition that McQ knows, which

is attributed to him in

proposition that

I,

am making a mess'.

know the proposition

(9),

is not the very same

Beth Dixon, know by my utterance of

'I

One might even add that McQ's failure to
I

know accounts for his failure to

arrest me for mess-making.

Inaccessible Propositional Guises
By rejecting principle (Q)

Castaneda has no way of

countering the Basic Argument we discussed in Chapter Two.
49
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It should follow from this that Castaneda is
committed to

the existence of first-person propositions.

But for

Castaneda, it is "propositional guises" that are the
objects
of belief and knowledge.

In the remainder of this chapter

I

examine whether or not there is any advantage to invoking

first-person propositional guises, rather than first-person
propositions, as the objects of self-attributed belief and

knowledge

Consider what Castaneda says about the following three
sentences
(11)

Before the pestilence Oedipus
believed that the previous King of
Thebes was dead.

(12)

The previous King of Thebes was
(the same as) Oedipus's father.

(13)

Before the pestilence Oedipus
didn't believe that Oedipus's
father was dead.

A simple analysis,
would be
that Oedipus, like anybody else, can
have beliefs about physical objects or
persons only under certain
characterizations. Thus, Oedipus by
[11] believes something of a certain
person X qua characterized by being the
previous King of Thebes and by [12] he
does not believe the same (namely, that
he is dead) of person X qua
characterized by being Oedipus's
father
Because the definite descriptions of
[11-13] refer to guises
[14] and
propositions:
different
below
are
[15]
[14] The previous King of Thebes
was dead.
27
[15] Oedipus's father was dead.
.

.

.

,

.

.

.

.

.

I

.

.

think we can understand what propositional guises are

like without resorting to the details of Castaneda's "Guise

50
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Theory". 28

The notion of a propositional guise is parasitic

on the notion of an individual guise.

descriptions in sentences

(11) -(13)

The definite

refer to (individual)

guises which, Castaneda suggests, present a person or
physical object to a believer by means of a property.

So,

Oedipus may have a belief about a particular person under
the guise, being the previous King of Thebes

have

a

,

but fail to

belief about this same person under the guise, being

Oedipus's father

.

Individual guises are similar to Fregean

senses that speakers attach to proper names.

Senses may

also be construed as modes of presentation of

a

referent to

whoever grasps that sense.
About propositional guises, Castaneda says, "We analyze
a

proposition gua having a certain logical form as a

propositional guise." 29

The criterion of difference for

propositional guises appears to be like the criterion of

difference for Fregean thoughts.

If Oedipus believes

(14)

but fails to believe (15), then the propositions expressed
by (14) and (15) are different.

For Castaneda, this amounts

to saying that (14) and (15) express different propositional

guises

Using propositional guises instead of propositions as
the objects of belief does not significantly affect the

Basic Argument.

We have already seen that Castaneda's

research on indexical reference is the inspiration for the

Irreplacability Thesis discussed in Chapter One.
Castaneda's view that the embedded occurrence of

51

It is
'I'

in

(16)

..

cannot be replaced by some non-indexical name or description
that refers to Beth Dixon, salva veritate ^0
.

I believe that I am late for class
(uttered by Beth Dixon)

(16)

Castaneda also accepts

a

two-place relation of belief

— but

one relating a believer to a propositional guise, rather

than a proposition.

The embedded clause in (16) expresses a

first-person propositional guise, and this guise is not
identical to the propositional guise expressed by the

embedded clause in (17), where

'T'

in

is replaced by

(17)

some non-indexical name or description referring to Beth
Dixon.
I believe that T is late for class
(uttered by Beth Dixon)

(17)

We might also say, as we did in the Basic Argument, that the

proposition expressed by the embedded clause in
identical to the proposition expressed by

class

'

is not

T is late for

when this latter proposition is the object of belief

for someone other than Beth Dixon.
I,

'

(16)

the speaker of (16), can use

follows that only

I

propositional guise

'I'

In this case,

since only

to refer to myself, it

can believe the first-person
I

believe in (16)

.

Castaneda, it seems,

is committed to the inaccessibility of first-person

propositional guises for the same reasons that

I

have argued

Kretzmann and Grim are committed to the inaccessibility of
first-person propositions.
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This result comes as no surprise to Castaneda.

in a

letter to Adams (March 16, 1982), Castaneda quotes Adams as
saying:
If exclusively indexical propositions
[i.e. strictly indexical propositional
guises] are among the objects of
knowledge, nothing that it makes sense
to think of someone distinct from me as
possibly knowing could be precisely the
same thing I know in knowing who I am. 31

Castaneda goes on to say:
Your last point is excellent.
It
captures very well a central commitment
of perceptual Guise Theory to the strict
privacy of all indexical references,
even to the point of postulating (as
others, e.g., Bertrand Russell, have
done before) private perceptual
fields 32

Problems for Propositional Guises

Castaneda invokes first-person propositional guises in
his analysis of first-person indexical sentences.

These

guises are like first-person propositions in the following
respect.

According to principle (FP)

an indexical sentence containing

'I'

,

only the speaker of

can entertain the

first-person proposition expressed by that sentence.

According to Castaneda's analysis, only the speaker of an
indexical sentence containing

'I'

can entertain the first-

person propositional guise expressed by that sentence.

So,

invoking propositional guises as the objects of belief does
not offer any advantage over first-person propositions.

We

are still left with inaccessible beliefs, when beliefs are
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,

.

a

,

identified with the second term of the belief relation

—

propositional guise.
Moreover, Castaneda's analysis of self-attribution is

even less compelling than any analysis of belief that

appeals to first-person propositions.

principle

By rejecting

Castaneda is committed to saying that a

(Q)

first-person propositional guise is not identical to any

quasi-indexical propositional guise.

If propositional

guises are the objects of belief, then first-person

propositional guises are individuated too narrowly to play
satisfactory role in explanations of behavior.

a

For example,

from Castaneda's version of the Basic Argument, no one but

I

can believe the propositional guise expressed by my

utterance of:
(18)

I

am late for class.

Moreover, because Castaneda rejects principle

propositional guise expressed by

(18)

the

(Q)

is not identical to

the embedded clause in (19)
Beth Dixon believes that she
herself is late for class.
(19)

This consequence has very little to recommend it.

Suppose

I

sincerely utter (18) as

office and down the hall.

I

rush out of my

It is natural to try to explain

my behavior by appealing to what

I

believe.

In this case,

what explains my frantic departure is the belief

I

to myself in the following sentence:
(16)

I

believe that
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I

am late for class.

attribute

Any of my colleagues who overhear my utterance of

(18)

are

in a position to explain why I acted on the basis of what

believe.
(19)
.

I

Ordinarily, we think they can do so by uttering

But on Castaneda's analysis my colleagues do not

attribute the very same belief to me in
to myself in (16).

(19)

as I attribute

Uttering (19) may not be sufficient for

explaining my reasons for acting, and this seems contrary to
our intuitions about the relation between sentences (16) and
(19)

— that

they attribute to me the same belief.

While Castaneda acknowledges the inaccessibility

brought about by his theory of first-person indexical
reference, he is not altogether reconciled to the problems
it raises.

For example, in "Knowledge and Self: A

Correspondence," Adams and Castaneda concur that rejecting
(Q)

does not have the theological implications Kretzmann

describes, because "We can still say that God knows all the

quasi-indexical propositions.
knows all the facts

.

," 33

.

In an important sense he

Castaneda may be trying to

extricate himself from the consequences of inaccessible

propositional guises.
successfully.

I

do not believe he does so

By his comment, Adams presumably means that

God and finite beings can know a quasi-indexical

propositional guise in the following way.

Suppose these two

sentences are true:
(20)

Beth Dixon knows that she herself

is late for class.

Sam knows that Beth Dixon knows
that she herself is late for class.
(21)
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.

By Castaneda's principle (P*)

,

Sam knows the propositional

guise expressed by 'she herself is late for class' in (20).

According to Adams and Castaneda, knowing this guise puts
Sam in a position to know "the fact" corresponding to the

first-person propositional guise expressed by my utterance
of

'

am late for class'.

I

But it is only according to some

extended sense of 'fact' that Sam knows the same thing

I

know in knowing the first-person propositional guise

expressed by (18).

Since it is propositional guises that

are the objects of belief, and Castaneda denies the strict

identity between first-person and quasi-indexical

propositional guises, Sam (or anyone other than me) fails to
know exactly what

I

know in knowing (18)

.

Castaneda tries

to have it both ways by claiming that first-person

propositional guises and their quasi-indexical counterparts
are not strictly identical; and also, that knowledge of a

quasi-indexical propositional guise constitutes knowledge of
"the fact" corresponding to the first-person propositional
guise.

If Castaneda chooses to analyze sentences containing

propositional attitude verbs as two-place relations between
an individual and a propositional guise, then there will be

no such thing as knowing a "fact" independently of being

presented with that fact by means of some propositonal guise
or other.

one

I

And, there is no guise that is identical to the

know in (18)
Moreover, even if Castaneda can articulate a sense of

'fact' that makes it plausible Sam and
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I

know the same

thing, Castaneda cannot appeal to these facts
to avoid

inaccessibility when we consider sentences that
contain

psychological verbs other than 'knows'.
(P*)

Castaneda needs

to infer that Sam knows the propositional guise

expressed by 'she herself is late for class' in
(21).
(P*)

is not true if we replace

believes', and
as well.

I

'knows'

But

in (P*) with

suspect it fails for other cognitive verbs

From the truth of:
(22) Beth Dixon believes that Mary
believes that the moon is made of green
cheese.

it does not follow that:
(23)

Beth Dixon believes that the moon

is made of green cheese.

Because there is no corresponding transitivity principle
(like (P*))

for 'believes', 34 it does not follow that anyone

other than Beth Dixon can believe even the quasi-indexical

propositional guise expressed by 'she herself is late for
class' in:
(19) Beth Dixon believes that she
herself is late for class.

In general, no one other than

I

can believe what

I

believe

by uttering a first-person indexical sentence.
By introducing into our ontology propositional guises

as the objects of belief and knowledge, we are committed to

the same kind of privileged access entailed by first-person

propositions.

This privacy creates problems for our

ordinary way of reporting about the beliefs of others, and
our explanations of their behavior.
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I

see no advantage to

invoking propositional guises rather than propositions in
the analysis of self-attribution.

If anything, the

inaccessibility created by guises is more problematic

because first-person and guasi-indexical propositional
guises are not identical.

This individuates the objects of

belief and knowledge even more narrowly than first-person
propositions.

For these reasons

I

recommend examining

another way to analyze self-attributed belief.
and Object

.

In Person

Chisholm also analyzes self-attribution as a

two-place relation, but the objects of psychological
attitudes are propositions that entail individual essences.
I

turn next to a discussion of Chisholm's proposal.
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CHAPTER

4

INDIVIDUAL ESSENCES

Introduction
In Person and Obnect

.

^

Chisholm devotes a chapter to

"The Direct Awareness of the Self."

In the course of

describing the epistemic relation that holds between
individuals and the states of affairs they think about,

Chisholm singles out belief about oneself for special
Chisholm's definition of self-attribution given

attention.

below entails that propositions that are self-presenting and
imply an individual essence are the objects of self-

attributed belief.

On the basis of this definition, and

other remarks Chisholm makes about the first-person
indexical,

I

attribute to him an argument for the existence

of first-person propositions.
In a later work,

2

Chisholm attempts to discredit his

earlier commitment to individual essences.

I

argue that his

precise criticisms are not entirely successful.

However,

there are other reasons for thinking that propositions that

contain individual concepts are not well suited to be the
objects of self-attributed belief.

Self -Attribution
In Person and Object 3 Chisholm offers the following

definition of self-attributed belief:
D.I.ll S believes himself to be F =Df
There is an individual essence C such
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that (a) a proposition implying S to
have C is self-presenting for S and (b)
S accepts a proposition which entails
the conjunction of C and the property of
being F. 4
To understand Chisholm's analysis it is useful to see what
it means for a proposition to imply that an individual has a

particular property, and how Chisholm defines the terms
'individual essence' and 'self-presenting'.

An 'individual

essence', or 'haecceity' is defined this way:
D.I.5 G is an individual essence (or
haecceity) =Df G is a property which is
such that, for every x, x has G if and
only if x is necessarily such that it
has G, and it is impossible that there
is a y other than x such that y has G. 5

Chisholm suggests the property being identical with me
is an individual essence.

Specifically, in a footnote he

says 'being identical with me' has as its intention 6 my
essence, while on another occasion used by a different
person, it has her essence as its intention.

7

According to Chisholm a proposition or state of affairs
may imply, with respect to some particular thing, that it
has a certain property.
D.I.6 P implies x to have the property
of being F =Df There is a property G
such that (i) G is an individual
concept, (ii) P entails the conjunction
of G and the property of being F, and
(iii) x has G. 8

Some further clarification may be needed to understand
D.I.6.

An individual concept is a property that only one

thing can have at

a time.

For example, being the tall est

man is an individual concept.
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All individual essences are

:

.

individual concepts, but not all individual concepts are

individual essences.

Chisholm characterizes propositions as noncontingent
things that are either true or false absolutely.

Propositions are a subspecies of states of affairs.
D.IV.3 P is a proposition =Df p is a
state of affairs, and it is impossible
that there is a time t and a time t'
such that p occurs at t and does not
occur at t 9
'

True propositions are states of affairs that occur, while
false propositions are states of affairs that do not
occur. 10

States of affairs, in turn, are characterized by

Chisholm as intentional objects:
D.IV.l P is a state of affairs =Df It is
possible that there is someone who
accepts p. 11

The details of the ontology of states of affairs need not

concern us here.

For our purposes, we may treat

propositions and states of affairs as the same kinds of
things. 12

In D.I.ll and D.I.6, Chisholm speaks of a

proposition entailing a property.

This notion he defines

as

D.I.3 P entails the property of being F
=Df P is necessarily such that (i) if it
obtains then something has the property
of being F and (ii) whoever accepts P
believes that something is F. 13

There is still one remaining term in D.I.ll that has
not yet been explicated.

Chisholm defines

a

self-presenting

state of affairs in the following way:
D.I.l h is such that it is selfpresenting to S at t =Df h occurs at t
64

and is necessarily such that, whenever
it occurs, then it is certain for s. 14

Examples of self-presenting states of affairs are
my feeling
depressed at a particular time, or my seeming to
see many

people at a particular time.

For a proposition,

P,

to be

sel f "Presenting to me at a time means that P is
true at that
time, and it is necessary that if p is true, then
P is

certain for me.

In general, the propositions that are self-

presenting are about our own mental states when we are
"

*

•

•

thinking certain thoughts, entertaining certain ideas

and having certain sensory experiences." 15

Moreover, if a

person knows some self-presenting proposition about herself
at a time, then she is directly acquainted with herself

— she

has 'direct knowledge' of herself. 16

Chisholm invokes individual essences in the definition
of self-attribution D.I.ll because he wishes to distinguish

the way in which we individuate ourselves from the way in

which we individuate things other than ourselves.

According

to Chisholm, there is a way of individuating a particular

thing that does not require identifying that thing in

relation to anything else.
se

'

He calls this 'individuation per

.

D.I.10 S individuates x per se =Df There
is a p such that (i) p is known by S,
(ii) there is a property p implies x to
have, and (iii) there is no individual
thing y such that y is other than x and
there is a property p implies y to
have. 17

Chisholm argues that the most likely candidate for each
person to individuate in this way is herself.
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If I do individuate myself per se then
there are propositions which are such
that: I know them to be true; they imply
some property that I have uniquely; and
they do not imply any property that any
other individual thing has uniquely.
What property, then, could it be that I
thus know myself to have uniquely and
that does not pick me out merely by
relating me uniquely to some other
individual thing? It can only be the
property of being me or being identical
with myself .^- 8

The reference to individual essences in the definition of

self-attribution suggests that if anyone self-attributes a
belief, she individuates herself 'per se'.

First-Person Propositions
At various places in Person and Object Chisholm

suggests that each person has privileged access to the

propositions that imply her own individual essence.
section

I

In this

explain how Chisholm's analysis of self-

attribution commits him to the existence of propositions
that only one person can believe or know.

Consider Chisholm's comments in the following passage:
The theory of the use of the first
person pronoun for example, 'I' that
fits most naturally with what I have
suggested is the following. Each person
who uses the first person pronoun uses
it to refer to himself and in such a way
that, in that use, its Bedeutung or
reference is himself and its Sinn or
intention is his own individual
A corollary would be that,
essence.
whereas each person knows directly and
immediately certain propositions
implying his own individual essence, no
one knows any propositions implying the
individual essence of anyone else.

—

—
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Chisholm says here that the intention of 'I', as it is
used on a particular occasion, is the speaker's individual
essence.

I

suspect Chisholm makes this claim to indicate

the role that individual essences play in self-

identification.

Suppose

I

assert a sentence that contains

an occurrence of 'I', as in the sentence,

'I

Regardless of whether this sentence is true,

am rich'.
I

may still

individuate myself successfully as the thing to which

attribute the property being rich
(per se)

I

.

I

individuate myself

in virtue of having a property uniquely that does

not also relate me to any other thing.

being identical with myself

,

This property is

which is my individual essence.

Chisholm also claims that

".

.

.

each person knows

directly and immediately certain propositions implying his
own individual essence."

The propositions that

I

know

directly and immediately are self-presenting propositions.
For example, if

I

feel depressed at a particular time, then

the proposition

I

feel depressed is self-presenting to me at

that time according to definition D.I.l.

And, this

proposition implies me to have a certain property.

By

definition D.I.6, there is an individual concept of me that
is entailed by this self-presenting proposition.

This

individual concept is my individual essence, being identical

with me 20
.

From definition D.I.ll it is clear that

I

know

"directly and immediately" certain propositions that imply

my individual essence because these propositions are self-
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presenting to me.

But it is not obvious why Chisholm says

in the above quotation that

.

.no

one knows any

propositions implying the individual essence of anyone
else."

It is true that no one but Beth Dixon can know

directly the propositions that are self-presenting to me
because no one but
mental states.

can be directly acquainted with my

I

But Chisholm does not include the

qualification 'directly' in any of the places where he
discusses this point 21

My interpretation of Chisholm's

.

comment is that he holds the stronger thesis: no one but
Beth Dixon can know simoliciter any proposition that implies

my individual essence.
no one but

I

Chisholm does not say explicitly why

can know the propositions that imply my

individual essence, but since his comments suggest that he

endorses first-person propositions, it is worth speculating
about how and why Chisholm was led to this conclusion.
I

maintain that the best explanation for Chisholm's

remarks about privileged access is that he holds the
following: only declarative sentences containing a first-

person indexical expression referring to an individual

x,

express propositions that entail the individual essence of x
To see this, consider the

on a particular occasion.

evidence that Chisholm holds:

(a)

all declarative sentences

containing a first-person indexical expression referring to
an individual x, entail the individual essence of x.

Suppose

I

assert the sentence

believe what

I

say, then

I

'I

am rich'.

If I

imply myself to have the property
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being rich.

Consequently, it is true that Beth Dixon

believes herself to be rich.

According to D.I.ll, it

follows that there is a proposition that is self —presenting

— perhaps it is
rich — and
accept a

to me

I

the proposition, mv believing that

am

I

proposition that entails the

conjunction of my individual essence being identical with
myself, and the property being rich
I

.

Accordingly, any time

assert a first-person declarative sentence attributing

property to myself, and

I

believe what

say,

I

a

it is true at

that time that

I

imply myself to have a certain property,

and by D.I.ll,

I

accept a proposition that entails my

individual essence.

Though the evidence is less clear,

Chisholm holds:

(b)

If

I

first-person indexical expression

a

entails the individual essence of

x,

Consider the case where
rich'.

also believe that

no declarative sentence that does not

contain an occurrence of

referring to

I

I

believe what

x.

assert the sentence 'Beth Dixon is
I

say, then

the proposition Beth Dixon is rich

.

I

believe and accept

But this proposition

does not entail my individual essence, since it is not the
case that the proposition Beth Dixon is rich is necessarily
such that if

I

accept this proposition, then

I

believe that

something has the property being identical with myself

may accept the proposition Beth Dixon is rich

beliefs about myself, whatsoever, if
I

am Beth Dixon 22
.
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I

,

.

I

but have no

fail to believe that

In fact,

according to Chisholm's criterion of identity

for states of affairs, the state of affairs
(or proposition)

my beinq rich is not identical to the proposition
that would
be expressed by a sentence

^

T is rich"1 where 'T' is a name

or description that refers to me, and that does not
contain

any occurrence of a first-person indexical.

To see this,

consider Chisholm's definition of the entailment relation
that holds for states of affairs.
D.IV.2 p entails q =Df p is necessarily
such that (a) if it obtains then q
obtains and (b) whoever accepts it
accepts q. 23

Chisholm articulates a criterion of identity for states of
affairs as follows:
if a state of affairs p is
identical with a state of affairs q,
then p entails q and q entails p. 2 ^
.

.

.

The state of affairs mv being rich is not identical to
the state of affairs Beth Dixon beinq rich

does not entail the latter.
am rich

hence,

because

,

since the former

may accept the proposition

I

I

but fail to believe that Beth Dixon is rich, and

,

fail to accept the proposition Beth Dixon is rich
I

fail to believe that

I

am Beth Dixon.

As in

previous examples we have discussed, the explanation for
this circumstance may be that

I

am suffering from amnesia.

By the same token, another person, S, may accept the

proposition Beth Dixon is rich

,

but fail to accept the

proposition expressed by my utterance of
S

fails to believe that

I

am Beth Dixon.

proposition expressed by my utterance of
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'

I

am rich' because

In general, the
'I

am rich' does

—
not entail the proposition expressed by f T is rich -

!

'

T'

,

where

replaced by some unique designation of me, not

is

containing any occurrence of a first-person indexical
regardless of who utters the latter sentence.
This reasoning is reminiscent of the Irreplacability
Thesis.

Recall that (IT) says: if

embedded behind

a

'I'

occurs in a sentence

propositional attitude verb, and

'I'

is

replaced by some co-referential name or description not

containing a first-person indexical, then it is always
possible for the resulting sentence to differ in truthChisholm does not explicitly argue for this claim

value.

about the failure of substitution for
Obi ect

.

'I'

in Person and

but it is suggested by various comments he makes

throughout his discussion of self-attribution.
in considering the claim that

I

For example,

individuate myself per se,

Chisholm writes in a footnote:
Putting the matter in terms of language,
we could say, with Sydney Shoemaker: 'In
no sense do I use the word "I" as an
abbreviation for any physical
If it should
description of myself.
turn out that I am having an
hallucination, and that the description
"the tall man sitting at the
typewriter" does not apply to me, I
would have to withdraw or amend the
statement "The tall man sitting at the
typewriter has a toothache," but would
not have to withdraw or amend my
statement "I have a toothache ."' 25
My interpretation of this passage is that Chisholm

wishes to emphasize that the occurrence of

declarative sentence

I

in a

'I'

assert guarantees that

I

individuate

myself per se, in virtue of my accepting a proposition that
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entails my individual essence.

This may not constitute an

explicit endorsement of (IT), but at the very least,

Chisholm's account of the entailment relations between
states of affairs has the consequence that no declarative

sentence that does not contain an occurrence of a first-

person indexical referring to

x,

entails the individual

essence of x 26
.

I

of (a)

have argued that Chisholm is committed to the truth
and

above, and is thereby committed to the truth

(b)

of the following thesis: only declarative sentences

containing a first-person indexical expression referring to
an individual x, express propositions that entail the

individual essence of x on a particular occasion.

If I am

right to interpret Chisholm in this way, then we are closer
to understanding why Chisholm claims that

".

.no

.

one

knows any propositions implying the individual essence of

anyone else ." 27
No one but

I

can use a first-person indexical

expression to refer to me.

Anyone else must use some other

designation of me, such as 'Beth Dixon' or 'she'.

But by

the previous argument, no sentence that does not contain a

first-person indexical expression referring to me, expresses
a

proposition that is identical to a proposition that

entails my individual essence, regardless of who utters such
a sentence.

So,

only

I

can believe or know the propositions

that entail my individual essence, since only

I

can accept

the propositions expressed by my utterances of first-person
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f

—

.

indexical sentences.

As in the Basic Argument of Chapter

Two, we must assume that an individual cannot believe
or

know a proposition unless she can utter

expresses that proposition.

a

In this way,

sentence that
individuals who

se ^ -a ttribute a belief by means of a first-person indexical

sentence have privileged access to the propositions that
imply their own individual essence.

These propositions are

first-person propositions according to the definition

(FP)

in Chapter Two.

Doing Away with Individual Essences
In this section

consider

I

a

criticism that Chisholm

makes about his earlier view of self-attribution in Person
and Object

though

I

show that this argument is not conclusive,

I

.

concur with Chisholm that we are better off without

individual essences.

Chisholm himself is the harshest critic of the theory
of self-attribution we have just described.

Person

.

In The First

he says:
I had previously defended the view
that, for each person, that person's use
of 'I' is such that he is its referent
and his individual essence or haecceity
I said, in effect, that
is its sense.
that he himself is wise'
believes
'Jones
'Jones has an individual
this:
tells us
essence H; he accepts a proposition
which is certain for him and
necessarily such that it is true if and
I,
only if whatever has H is wise'.
able
to
is
one
too, suggested that no
I
other
any
-propositions of
grasp the
.

.

.

'

'

person
This view is plausible only if it is
plausible to suppose that there are I
'
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—

.

.

.

propositions. And, as we have seen, the
most plausible version of the thesis
that there are I -propositions
presupposes that there are individual
essences and that each person can
readily grasp his own; but we are now
sceptical about these presuppositions. 28
'

'

In this next passage Chisholm describes his reasons for

being sceptical about individual essences.
It seems doubtful that I can ever be
said thus to grasp thus (sic) my own
individual essence or haecceity.
If I
were able to grasp it, shouldn't I also
be able to single out its various marks?
Perhaps I can single out some of the
marks of my individual essence if I
have one. Thus it may include various
universal essential properties (for
example, being red or non-red, or being
a musician if a violinist)
And perhaps
I can single out certain non-universal
essential properties (for example, being
an individual thing and being a person)
But if I can grasp my individual
essence, then I ought also to be able to
single out in it those features that are
If 'being identical with
unigue to it.
me' is my individual essence and 'being
identical with you' is yours, then,
presumably, each analyzes into
personhood and something else as well
one something else in my case and
another in yours but I haven't the
faintest idea what this something else
might be. 29

—

.

—

(3)

In this passage Chisholm seems to be reasoning in the

following way:
If there exist individual essences,
then they must be such that they are
grasped (or conceived)
(1)

Individual essences are not grasped
(or conceived)
(2)

Therefore, there do not exist
individual essences.
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Following Jaegwon Kim in his review of The First Person 30
r

i

take Chisholm's concept of 'grasping' to be
synonymous with
the concept of 'conceiving'.

Conceiving is one of the

undefined primitives in the ontology presented in The First
Person

.

Chisholm explains that the concept of conceiving is

inseparably connected" with the concept of

a

property.

Specifically:
(PI) Every property is possibly such
that there is someone who conceives

it. 31

Principle (PI) provides some justification for premise
Since individual essences are defined as properties,

(1).

(PI)

requires that they be conceivable.
Premise
conceived.

states that individual essences are not

(2)

Chisholm reasons in the following way:

two people, S and S* utter the sentence

'I

Suppose

am standing'.

According to the definition of self-attribution in Person
and Object

,

the proposition S accepts implies S's individual

essence, and the proposition S* accepts implies S*'s
Call S's individual essence 'H s

individual essence.

S*'s individual essence

properties that

a

'H s *'.

and

If individual essences are

person has uniquely, then there must be

something that distinguishes H s from H s *.

when both S and S* report

different things.

'

'I

In one sense,

am standing' they believe

And, the difference between what S and S*

believe can be explained by the difference between their
individual essences.

We might try to explain this by

assuming essences are analyzable into their constituent
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,

partis,

and that conceiving an individual essence involves

conceiving its constituents.

The problem with such an

account, Chisholm argues, is that S does not know what

constituents of H s make this essence different from H
s *, as
well as all other individual essences.

Chisholm actually

makes this claim on behalf of himself only

— that

"I haven't

the faintest idea what [features are unique to my own

individual essence]." 32

But the implicit inference is that

no one else is in a more privileged position with respect to

grasping or conceiving the constituents of her own
individual essence.

Chisholm gives us one example of an individual essence
that is not conceived

stronger claim in
conceived.

(2)

— his

own.

But this falls short of the

that no individual essences are

Chisholm's reasoning leaves open the possibility

that someone other than Chisholm can determine what makes

her own essence different from others.

The truth of

(2)

has

not been established definitively, nor has the conclusion

that there do not exist individual essences.
Perhaps Chisholm only wishes to cast suspicion on the

existence of individual essences, for he concludes his

discussion of essences in the following way:
We have these two options, then, so
far as individual essences are
First, we could say that,
concerned.
although each of us has an individual
essence, these individual essences
involve certain properties that are
'unanalysable' and yet also such as to
But if
be restricted to a single thing.
'being identical with me' implies
personhood, then it is at least
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partially analysable. Hence we would
have to say that my individual essence
contains an unanalysable part and it
is in that unanalysable part that the
difference between my individual essence
and yours is to be found.
The second possibility is to say
that we have been too readily attracted
to the assumption that each individual
has an individual essence that he can
grasp.
This latter course seems to be
the right one 33

—

.

Chisholm is right to opt for an alternative theory of

self-attribution that does not invoke individual essences.
The reason for this is not simply the inconceivability of

these essences, but because individual concepts, in general,
do not explain self-identification in cases where a believer

uses

'I'

to self-attribute a belief.

I

take up this point

in the last section of this chapter.

Even if we concede Chisholm's argument against

individual essences, his case is even less persuasive

against first-person propositions.
".

are

.

the most plausible version of the thesis that there

.

I
'

According to Chisholm,

'

-propositions presupposes that there are individual

essences and that each person can readily grasp his own ." 34
This comment suggests that the argument against the

conceivability of individual essences is, indirectly, an
argument against first-person propositions.

necessarily true.

propositions

I

But this is not

The argument for first-person

have attributed to Chisholm in the previous

section is not significantly affected by dropping talk of
individual essences altogether.

following sentence is true:
77

To see this, suppose the

.

(4) I believe that
Beth Dixon)

Sentence

(4)

am rich'

in

I

am rich (uttered by

relates me to the proposition expressed by
In Chisholm's terminology,

(4).

proposition expressed by

'I

I

accept

'

p

'

.

•

accept the

I

am rich' in (4), and this

proposition entails the property of being rich
proposition

'I

Call the

.

As we saw in the previous

section, Chisholm's criterion of identity for propositions
(states of affairs) has it that / is not identical to the

proposition expressed by ^ T is rich"1

where

,

"I"

is a name

or description referring to me, not containing any

occurrence of a first-person indexical.
0

This is so because

does not entail the proposition expressed by

when an appropriate replacement for
Moreover, it is

a

use the indexical

believe

0,

'T'

^

T is rich~*

is made. 35

matter of grammatical fact that only
'I'

to refer to myself.

the proposition

I

am rich

.

Chisholm's account that the proposition
is a first-person proposition.

So,

only

I

I

can

can

It still follows on
I

accept, namely

,

Hence, Chisholm's rejection

of individual essences in The First Person does not directly

jeopardize the existence of first-person propositions.

Doing Away with Individual Concepts
The difficulty with Chisholm's proposal for analyzing

self-attribution is not simply that individual essences are
inconceivable.

But rather, that propositions containing any

individual concept are not well suited to be the objects of
indexical belief.
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The role of individual essences in Chisholm's analysis
of self-attribution is to explain how we identify
ourselves.

As Chisholm tells us, individual essences are the 'sense' or

'intention' of 'I' on a particular occasion 36

We might

.

understand 'sense' in this context to be something like
Frege's notion of

a

mode of presentation of a referent,

where grasping the sense of an expression is a method for

determining the referent of that expression.
individual essence is the sense of

'I'

if an

So,

on a particular

occasion, then a believer grasps this essence, and

identifies herself as the unique thing that has the property

being identical with me

.

Of course, if individual essences

are not conceivable, then they cannot be appealed to as the

concepts that believers grasp by way of identifying
themselves.

But there is another more general problem with

using any individual concept to explain how a speaker
identifies herself in cases of self-attribution.
Suppose

I

do know some property or properties that

I

may specify that

I

have necessarily and uniquely.

Then

I

have these properties by means of a definite description
But if the sense of 'I' is

that uniquely refers to me.

specifiable by a definite description true of me that does
not contain an occurrence of a first-person indexical, then
it will always be possible for me to fail to believe that

am the person referred to by that description.
I

can conceive of the properties

uniquely, it is possible that
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I

I

So,

I

even if

have necessarily and

will fail to believe

I

have

these properties.

The problem in this case is not that

I

am

unable to conceive my individual essence, but that there is
no individual concept specifiable by a definite description

that

I

will always believe

I

have.

Hence, first-person

propositions that contain such individual concepts do not
explain self-identification any better than propositions
that contain individual essences.

What this shows is that Chisholm's attempt to explain

self-identification by his analysis of self-attribution is
inadequate.

We cannot use individual concepts (individual

essences, or otherwise) to explain how a speaker identifies

herself when she utters a first-person indexical sentence.
However, it may still turn out that first-person

propositions are Fregean propositions containing senses as
constituents.
I
'

'

There is an alternative theory of Fregean

-propositions that allows senses to be specified by

something other than

a

definite description uniquely

identifying the speaker.

In the next chapter

I

examine

Gareth Evans's proposal for analyzing self-attribution.

It

may be our last attempt to make out an acceptable analysis
of self-attribution that preserves the two-place relation of

belief between a believer and a proposition.
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CHAPTER

5

PRIVATE THOUGHTS

Introduction
In "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry," 1 Frege makes

certain remarks about the indexical

'I*

that suggest he

believed in the existence of thoughts only one person can
grasp.

In this chapter

I

discuss an interpretation of Frege

on indexicals by Gareth Evans.

Evans's analysis of self-

attribution is worth exploring because it does not entail
the existence of propositional guises or individual
essences.

that

'I'

But as

-thoughts

I

show, Evans attributes to Frege the view

— the

sentences containing

thoughts expressed by indexical

'I'

— are

private and incommunicable.

I

argue that Perry's three-place relation of belief does not

obviously lead to inaccessible Fregean thoughts or beliefs,
despite Evans's claim that Perry's analysis is

a "notional

variant" of his own.

Frege and

I
'

Frege says little about demonstrative and indexical
expressions, and what he does say is not easy to reconcile

with his other claims about the role of senses and thoughts
in his philosophy of language.

2

One example of this is

Frege's failure to provide a unifying theory of
demonstratives.

In "The Thought," Frege says that one and

'Today
the same thought will be expressed by an utterance of

84

is sunny',

and 'Yesterday was sunny' uttered on the

following day.
If someone wants to say the same today
as he expressed yesterday using the word
'today', we must replace this word with
'yesterday'.
Although the thought is
the same its verbal expression must be
different so that the sense, which would
otherwise by affected by the different
times of utterance, is readjusted 3
.

While Frege indicates that we can express the same thought
by an appropriate exchange of the expressions 'here' and
'there

', 4

'I'.

Consider the following passage

he resists extending this claim to the indexical

— one

of the few where

Frege seems explicitly concerned with the indexical 'I':

Now everyone is presented to himself in
a particular and primitive way, in which
he is presented to no-one else.
So,
when Dr. Lauben thinks that he has been
wounded, he will probably take as a
basis this primitive way in which he is
presented to himself. And only Dr.
Lauben himself can grasp thoughts
determined in this way. But now he may
want to communicate with others. He
cannot communicate a thought which he
alone can grasp. Therefore, if he now
says 'I have been wounded', he must use
the 'I' in a sense which can be grasped
by others, perhaps in the sense of 'he
who is speaking to you at this moment',
by doing which he makes the associated
conditions of his utterance serve for
the expression of his thought 5
.

Frege is maintaining that no other indexical may be

exchanged for
grasps.

'I'

that will express the same thought Lauben

Moreover, the thought Lauben understands when he

thinks he himself has been wounded can be grasped only by
Lauben.

It is incommunicable to all others.

means can be explained in the following way.
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What Frege

If Lauben thinks he has been wounded, then he is

disposed to utter the sentence

Frege, the sense of the sentence

thought that is

a

have been wounded'.

'I

'I

have been wounded' is a

function of the sense of

of 'have been wounded

'. 6

For

If the sense of

'I'
'I'

and the sense

represents

what Frege describes as the "particular and primitive way"
in which only Lauben is presented to himself, then the

thought expressed by the sentence Lauben is disposed to

utter
a

— 'I

have been wounded'

constituent.

of 'I'

— contains

this special sense as

But Frege leads us to believe that the sense

is incommunicable,

since Lauben might choose to

communicate the fact that he has been wounded by

associating

a

different sense with 'I', such as,

'he who is

speaking to you at this moment'.

The implication is that

there are two kinds of senses for

'I'

and the speaker may

associate different senses with this word.
unlike what Frege says about proper names

This is not

— that

different

speakers may associate different senses with a name

7
.

But

Frege does not suggest there are incommunicable senses that

attach to proper names.
If no one but Lauben can think of Lauben by means of

the sense he attaches to his own use of

'

I',

and this sense

is a constituent of the thought expressed by 'I have been

wounded' as Lauben is disposed to utter this sentence, then
the thought expressed is inaccessible to all but Lauben

himself.

"...

This reading is consistent with Frege's claim that

only Dr. Lauben himself can grasp thoughts determined
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.

.

in this way."

Similarly, the definition of a first-person

proposition proposed in Chapter Two states that

a first-

person proposition can be an object of thought only for the
speaker of the sentence expressing that proposition.

Although (FP

8

does not explicitly mention Fregean senses,

)

it is general enough to accommodate such entities.

This

reading of Frege implies that when Dr. Lauben thinks to

himself or utters
'I'

'I

have been wounded' and associates with

the primitive sense for himself, Lauben expresses a

thought only he can grasp

— or,

a

first-person proposition.

The Sense of

'I'

In "Understanding Demonstratives " 9 Gareth Evans invokes
a

non-standard conception of sense to explain Frege's
I

comments about

'

'

Evans suggests that to grasp the sense

of a singular term is to think of the referent of this term
in a particular way.

Other philosophers have thought that

senses are modes of presentation that determine

a referent,

but what is different about Evans's reading of Frege is his

insistence that senses do not exist independently of their

referents
on the present conception, the
sense of a singular term is a way of
thinking about a particular object:
something that obviously could not exist
if that object did not exist to be
If we take seriously
thought about.
Frege's metaphor of sense as a mode of
presentation of reference, we shall not
expect to be provided with
specifications of sense save by means of
specifications of reference ... 10
.

.

.
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—
The biggest challenge to Evans's interpretation of

Fregean senses are those passages where Frege talks about
the senses of sentences that contain empty singular terms

terms that have no referent.

Evans attempts to show Frege

regarded such terms as abnormal occurrences, and that the

primary notion of sense operative in Frege is one where the
senses of expressions present an existent referent 11

I

.

will not argue this textual point here.

I

am more

interested in evaluating Evans's interpretation of Fregean
senses when they are characterized as "ways of thinking" of
objects.

Evans supposes there are various ways of thinking about
objects, and these ways of -thinking are relations between

person and an object.

These relations are individuated

according to the kind of object a person thinks about.
example,

—a

way of thinking about oneself

different kind of relation than R 2
a

a

—a

— must

For

be a

way of thinking about

particular day, today.
About the sense of

'I'

Evans proposes:

has a
as uttered [by a person, s]
is
there
completing sense if and only if
some particular way in which one must
think of the referent [s] in order to
understand the utterance containing
it 12
['I']

,

.

'I

am F' as said by a person,

s,

expresses a thought that

consists of the ordered pair of the incomplete sense
is F'

by s.

and the completing sense expressed by
S

grasps the sense of

this relational property:
88

'I'

'I'

'

(

c^~)

as uttered

if and only if s satisfies

)

/Vcr-l^s))

(P)

.

Evans provides a necessary condition only for R obtaining:
x
(

(

P
*

P
'

Ri(S',S) only if S' = S 13

)

.

tells us that identity is a necessary condition for

satisfying the relation R^.
a

Since Evans believes that

way of thinking about oneself,

conscious thought.

S

R-^

is

must be capable of self-

But we can see that the relation of

identity is not a sufficient condition for R 1 obtaining
since if

S

is identical to S',

it does not follow that S is

thinking of herself in some primitive way, or even that

S is

thinking at all.
Evans refers to R 1 as an "unspecified relation ." 14

Perhaps he means he is unable to specify the sufficient

conditions for

a

person to stand in relation R^ to herself.

Since this relation plays an important role in the

characterization of

I
'

'

-thoughts, it is worth investigating

what Evans has in mind by introducing R^

.

One point Evans

is clear about is that R^ represents a way of thinking of

oneself that is not reducible to any other way of thinking,

"...

particularly not to any which exploit knowledge of

description of the object." 1 ^

Evans has more to say about

self-identification in The Varieties of Reference 16
.

We are not interested in all thoughts
which a subject may have 'about
himself', for presumably a person may
think about someone who is in fact
himself without realizing that he is
doing so. Oedipus was thinking about
Oedipus, that is to say, himself, when
he thought that the slayer of Laius
should be killed; but Oedipus was not
thinking about himself 'self89

a

^

.

consciously' (this is just a label for
the kind of thinking which interests
us)
because he did not realize that he
was the slayer of Laius.
,

To think of oneself self-consciously is not to think of

oneself by means of some descriptive concept, as Oedipus

thought of himself under the description 'the slayer of
Laius'.

Evans's reasoning has

a

familiar ring.

Argument of Chapter Two makes use of

a

The Basic

premise that

restricts substitution of embedded occurrences of
some description true of the speaker

— what

I

'I'

for

have earlier

referred to as the Irreplacability Thesis 18
.

Evans seems to

accept some version of this premise at the level of
thoughts, rather than expressions, in order to single out

self-conscious thought from other ways of thinking of
oneself
What is it for Oedipus to realize that
he is the slayer of Laius? One thing
seems clear; it is not to realize that
the $ is the slayer of Laius, for any
It is not to
descriptive concept
realize that the son of Jocasta is the
slayer of Laius, or that the man who
answered the riddle of the Sphinx is the
slayer of Laius, because Oedipus might
realize these things without realizing
that he is the slayer of Laius (not
knowing that, or having forgotten that,
he is the son of Jocasta or the man who
answered the Sphinx's riddle); and he
might realize that he is the slayer of
Laius without realizing these things,
for the same reason.^
Because Oedipus is not disposed to utter

'I

am the

slayer of Laius', but is disposed to utter '( is the slayer
of Laius',

Oedipus)

,

(where j is some description referring to
(IT)

would allow us to infer there is no
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description that can be substituted for

in this context.

'I'

Until now, we have focused exclusively on the semantic

characteristics of the expression
subject who uses these indexicals.

'I'

rather than on the

No attempts have been

made to explain why such failure of substitution occurs.
But Evans singles out what is distinctive about

property of the speaker and what she knows.

'I'

to be a

This is a

significant departure from the views discussed in Chapter
Two.

Though there is little textual evidence in Frege that

supports this epistemological point about selfidentification, in the end Evans's proposal is consistent

with what Frege explicitly says about the thoughts expressed
by first-person indexical sentences, that

"...

only Dr.

Lauben himself can grasp thoughts determined in this way."
Some philosophers have thought it problematic to

interpret Frege's comments about

'I'

in this way.

For

example, John Perry offers this complaint:

Nothing could be more out of the spirit
of Frege's account of sense and thought
than an incommunicable, private
thought 20
.

Perry argues that Frege could not have been committed to
'I

'-thoughts only one person can grasp because the notion of

a private and incommunicable sense for

problematic.

'I'

is itself

Perry reasons as follows:

Suppose M is the private, incommunicable sense for
that Beth Dixon associates with this word.
such a sense
I

I,

'I'

For there to be

Beth Dixon, must be aware of a way in which

am presented to myself and to no one else.
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And,

since

senses are inodes of presentation that uniquely determine a
referent, M must determine a concept that only

I

fall under.

It is this second requirement that Perry finds difficult to

satisfy.

For example, it might be that only

I

am aware of

myself under the aspect 'person with a sore throat' because
I

haven't yet told anyone my throat is sore.

Here M will be

the primitive sense corresponding to this aspect of myself

that is private to me.

It does not follow, Perry argues,

that M will determine a unique concept that only Beth Dixon
falls under.

sense of

'I'

If

'the person with the sore throat'

is the

as Beth Dixon uses it, this sense will not

uniquely determine Beth Dixon as referent; it is quite
likely there are any number of people that this description
will be true of at the time when

I

use it.

In general,

Perry does not think there are aspects of me only
aware of having, and that will also determine

concept that only

I

fall under.

a

I

am

unique

Since these conditions must

be satisfied if M is to be a sense that presents a unique

thing as the referent of 'I', there are no private,
incommunicable senses for

'I '. 21

In trying to specify the sense, M,

for 'I', Perry

assumes that M is a definite description of the referent of
'I'

in a particular context.

The following passage is

evidence of this assumption.
How can we extract from a demonstrative
an appropriate completing sense? Such a
sense, it seems, would have to be
intimately related to the sense of a
unique description of the value of the
demonstrative in the context of
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'

utterance.
But where does such a
description come from ? 22
But Evans explicitly rejects Perry's assumption that

the sense of

'I'

must be a definite description that

uniquely determines a referent.

As we have already seen,

Evans interprets Frege's notion of sense to be

a

way of

thinking of a referent that cannot be grasped independently
of this referent.

uses

'I'

And, according to Evans, when a subject

to report a thought, she needn't be thinking of

herself by means of some descriptive concept 23
.

That Perry

is unable to find a definite description that uniquely

refers to the speaker of

fails to show there is no

'I'

private and incommunicable sense for 'I'.

'

In this section

I

I

Thoughts

show how Evans's interpretation of

Frege leads him to say that Fregean

I
'

'

-thoughts can be

entertained only by the speaker of a first-person indexical
sentence that expresses that thought.
Recall Frege's claim that "everyone is presented to

himself in a particular and primitive way, in which he is

presented to no one else." 2 ^

Depending on the scope of the

quantifier word 'everyone', Frege's comments may mean
either:

There is a particular and primitive
way of thinking of oneself such that
every person thinks of herself in
exactly this way; or
(a)
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.

(b) For every person, there is a
particular and primitive way in which
she thinks of herself 25
.

Reading

implies a way of thinking of oneself that is the

(a)

same for different people.

Reading

implies that every

(b)

person thinks of herself in a different way.
The difference between the readings in

(a)

and

(b)

may

reflect a difference between two different conceptions of
sense.

Reading

(a)

correctly characterizes the sense of

'I'

if we regard senses as the conventional significance of an

expression or its linguistic meaning that remains constant
on every occasion of use.

The linguistic meaning of

'I'

may

be what every native speaker grasps in using 'I'.
Or,

if the sense of

'I'

is construed as a mode of

presentation of its referent, then reading

(b)

correctly

describes the relation between senses and their referents.
If the sense of 'I'

is a mode of presentation of a referent

on a particular occasion, then as the referent varies, so

must the sense of 'I', since the sense must uniquely pick
out a referent on a particular occasion of use.

'I'

as used

by different speakers cannot have the same sense on

different occasions of use, so the sense must change
Reading

relative to each speaker.
this consequence, since

(b)

is consistent with

(b)

implies that for every speaker

who uses 'I', there is a different sense for 'I'.
Evans characterizes the sense of

reading
states

(b)

'I

'

I

'

according to

According to Evans's proposal, when Hume

am hot', the thought Hume entertains will consist
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of the sense of the predicate expression

'

(

is hot'

£>t)

and

the sense of

'I'

sense of

he thinks of himself in the particular way that

'I'

as spoken by Hume.

When Hume grasps the

can be represented by Hume standing in relation

himself.
hot'

to

The thought Hume expresses when he reports

am

'I

is represented by Evans as the ordered pair:
<

(1)

Ax(R 1 (x,Hume)

hot > 26

)

sense of '(pc)

,

is

'

When Heimson reports

'I

am hot', Heimson stands in the

relation R 1 to himself, but the entire thought Heimson
expresses by an utterance of
(2)

<

'I

am hot' is represented as:

A xfR 1 (x, Heimson)

)

sense of

,

'

(oC)

is hot'>.^ 7

Both Heimson and Hume think of themselves in the same

way by standing in relation R^ to themselves.

But, Evans

explains, we cannot give the same account of what makes each

person's thought have the object it does, e.g., Hume's
thought about Hume, and Heimson 's thought about Heimson.
Evans insists the sense of

'I'

is not to be identified with

the relation type, R lf by itself, but this relation together

with the first member of the thought
the individual, Hume.

when Hume utters

'I

A person x grasps the sense of

(R^ (x, Hume)

satisfies the relational property
can grasp the sense of
am hot'.

the case of (1),
'I'

am hot' if and only if x satisfies the

relational property

•I

— in

'

I

28
)

.

Since only Hume

\x(R ± (x, Hume)

)

,

only Hume

in the context where Hume utters

'

In general, only the speaker of 'I'
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in a

particular context can grasp the sense of
the

R-l

by standing in

relation to herself.

By identifying the sense of

and the referent of

'I'

committed to reading
a

'I'

(b)

'

I

with the relation

*

in a particular context,

above.

Evans is

The sense of 'I', which is

constituent of Heimson's thought when he utters

hot',

is

X x (Ri

(x,

Heimson)

)

.

am

'I

And when Hume utters

am

'I

hot' the sense of 'I' on this occasion of use, which is a

constituent of Hume's thought, is

X x (R x (x, Hume)

)

.

Thus,

according to Evans, every person thinks of herself in

different way.

At least, the senses of

'I'

a

are different as

this word is used by different people.

Evans's analysis of first-person indexical sentences
implies only one person can entertain the thoughts expressed
by these sentences.
(1)

Only Hume can entertain the thought in

because only Hume satisfies the relational property

/\x(R 1 (x,Hume)

)

by being identical to Hume.

Heimson can entertain the thought in
Heimson satisfies
Heimson.

X

x (R^ (x, Heimson)

(2)
)

And, only

because only

by being identical to

Perhaps Heimson can know that Hume is hot, but not

by entertaining the very same thought Hume entertains when
he entertains (1).

Heimson's thought that Hume is hot will

not contain R^ as a constituent, since this is the relation
of self-identification that represents the way in which

each person thinks about himself.
a

Heimson must make use of

relation other than R^ to express the thought that Hume is

hot.

Hence, Heimson's thought that Hume is hot will be
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different from the thought Hume expresses in (1).
only Hume stands in the relation

R-^

Since

to Hume, only Hume can

entertain the thought that contains as constituents the
individual Hume and the relation R^.

Two Analyses of Belief
At one point Evans describes the analysis of indexical

belief John Perry advances in "Frege on Demonstratives" 29 as
a

"notational variant" of his own.

puzzling.
'I'

This comment is

Evans's interpretation of Frege entails there are

thoughts that only the speaker can grasp, yet Perry is

unsympathetic to this interpretation.

In this section

I

explain how Evans's analysis of indexical belief differs
from Perry's.

Consider the following passage where Evans compares
Perry's account to his own:
Perry uses locutions like "By
entertaining the sense of 'I', S
apprehended the thought consisting of
Hume and the sense of
(^) is hot"', and
so perhaps he has in mind some such
construction as:
[3] S apprehends-in way-w <x, Sense
'

is F'>
of
(oc)
But surely this is now a notational
variant of Frege's approach, at best.
Where Frege would write:
[4] S believes <x, w, Sense of
'

'

(p^)

is F >
'

Perry will write:
[5] S believes-in-way-w <x, Sense
of
(X) is F'>
by apprehending such and
believes,
or "S
thought consisting of
the
such a sense,
is hot'."
(oC)
of
x and the sense
'

'
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Suppose Hume reports
refers to Hume.

'I

For Evans,

am hot', and 'S' in
in

'w'

relation of self-identification.

The sense of
'I'

X x (R x (x Hume)
,

)

,

'I'

which is

constituent of the thought Hume expresses by
Since only Hume can grasp the sense of

'I'

is the

'I'

in a particular

We earlier represented the sense of

relational property

(5)

stands for the

(4)

combination of R x and the referent of
context.

and

(4)

'

as the

a
I

am hot'.

by satisfying

this relational property, only Hume can entertain the

thought that includes this sense as
the sense in which Fregean

'I

a

constituent.

This is

'-thoughts are inaccessible to

all but the agents of first-person indexical sentences.

For Perry,

'

believing-in-way-w

'

,

as it occurs in (5),

represents, for example, Hume's entertaining the linguistic

meaning or 'role' of the indexical expression 'I'.
what Perry says about the role of

a

demonstrative, we can

infer that different people grasp the same role for

different occasions of use. 31

From

'I'

on

Perry says:

When we understand a word like 'today,'
what we seem to know is a rule taking us
from an occasion of utterance to a
certain object.
'Today' takes us to the
very day of utterance, 'yesterday' to
the day before the utterance, 'I' to the
speaker, and so forth.
I shall call
this the role of the demonstrative. 32

Perry's analysis in

Fregean thoughts.

(5)

does not entail inaccessible

There is nothing intrinsic to the

consitituents of Hume's thought in (5), neither Hume, nor
the sense of

'

(oC)

is hot',

that prevents these objects from

being the constituents of thoughts expressed by someone
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,

.

other than Hume.

For example, if Heimson utters 'That man

is hot* while pointing to Hume, the thought
expressed by

this utterance contains as constituents Hume
and the sense
of
is hot'.
in this case, both Heimsen and Hume utter
(</*)
'

sentences that express thoughts containing the same
constituents.
one difference between Evans's representation in

So,
(4)

and the representation Evans attributes to Perry in
(5),
I

is the way

'

'

-thoughts are individuated.

interpretation of Fregean

'I'

Evans's

-thoughts entails that these

thoughts can be entertained only by the speaker of

a first-

person indexical sentence, while Perry's way of

individuating

I
'

'

-thoughts preserves the sharability of

these thoughts, insofar as more than one person can

entertain the thought expressed by a first-person indexical
sentence
Nevertheless, Evans's comparison of the analyses in
and

(5)

suggests the following rejoinder.

analysis in

thought

S

(5)

(4)

On Perry's

it does not make sense to refer to the

believes, per se, but only the thought

'believes-in-way-w'

.

If Hume reports

'I

S

am hot', then the

correct description of this belief is that Hume believes wl
(believes-in-way-jJ the thought containing Hume and the sense

of

'(<*<)

is hot' by entertaining the meaning or role of 'I'

in the context where Hume is the speaker.

But if Heimson

reports 'That man is hot' while pointing to Hume, then

Heimson believes w2 the thought containing as constituents
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and the sense of

Hunte

•

is hot', by entertaining the

(<*)

role or meaning of the demonstrative
'that man'.

While the

propositional objects of Hume's belief
wl and Heimson's
belief w2 are the same, they do not share the
same belief-inway n
only Hume can believe
the thought containing
.

wl

as a

constituent the individual Hume, since only Hume can
use the
indexical 'I' to refer to himself. While Perry's
analysis
in (5)

does not commit him to Fregean thoughts that only one

person can apprehend, we might think it commits him to
inaccessible beliefs"
believe.

beliefs that only one person can

In general, on Perry's account it will be true

that only the speaker of an indexical sentence

'I

am F' can

believe-in-way-L the Fregean thought containing the speaker

herself, and the sense of

'

(<k)

is F'.

Still, it is not clear anything worse follows from the

fact that,

for example, only Hume can believe-in-way-L

thought containing Hume and the sense of

representation in

(5)

'

(c/.)

,

the

is hot'.

The

implies that Hume's self-attributed

belief is a three-place relation between Hume,

a

way of

believing a thought, and the thought expressed by the
indexical sentence

'I

am hot' uttered by Hume.

From this

proposal for analyzing belief attributions, it is not clear

what components of this relation individuate Hume's belief.
At times. Perry suggests that beliefs might be either

identified with the sense entertained by the believer (the
role of a demonstrative)

,

or the thought (proposition)

apprehended by the believer.
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For example, Perry says:

Why should we care how someone
apprehends a thought, so long as he
does? I can only sketch the barest
suggestion of an answer here. We use
senses to individuate psychological
states, in explaining and predicting
action.
It is the sense entertained,
and not the thought apprehended, that is
tied to human action. When you and I
entertain the sense of "A bear is about
to attack me," we behave similarly.
We
both roll up in a ball and try to be as
still as possible.
Different thoughts
apprehended, same sense entertained,
same behavior.
When you and I both
apprehend the thought that I am about to
be attacked by a bear, we behave
differently.
I roll up in a ball, you
run to get help.
Same thought
apprehended, different sense
entertained, different behavior. 33
If we use senses, or the role of a demonstrative, to

individuate psychological states in the way Perry describes,
then there is

a

straightforward sense in which Hume's belief

is accessible to other people.

utter

'I

When both Heimson and Hume

am hot' they believe the same thing, since they

each entertain the same sense or role of the indexical

'I'

on different occasions of use.

Perry also indicates there are times when we want to

correctly identify what is believed.
identify the belief with
these)

,

context.

a

In these cases we

Fregean thought (as Perry defines

rather than the role of

a

demonstrative in a

He says:

Suppose Mary utters (7) [I believe that
Russia and Canada quarrelled today.] on
August 1, and I want to report the next
If I want to
day on what she believed.
I should
entertained,
report the sense
and
Russia
that
use (8) [Mary believed
this
Canada quarrelled today.] But
gives the wrong result. Clearly I would
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)

use (9) [Mary believed that Russia and
Canada quarrelled yesterday.] 34

Perry suggests in this passage that Hume's belief is
the

thought containing Hume and the sense of

'

is hot'.

(p<j

in

other words, to specify what Hume believes we need only make

reference to this thought, regardless of the way in which
the thought is entertained.

In this case, the thought

expressed by Hume's utterance of

'

I

am hot' can be an object

of belief for individuals other than Hume.

Unless it can be

shown that individuating beliefs in this way is
inappropriate, it appears Perry's analysis of belief in

(5)

does not entail inaccessible beliefs in any way that is

objectionable. 35
Evans cannot so easily avoid inaccessible beliefs.

Evans's analysis of self-attribution in

(4)

is a two-place

relation, where what Hume believes is identified with the

Fregean thought

<

A

x(R 1 (x,Hume)

)

,

sense of

'

(o4

is hot'>.

On this account, there are no other ways of individuating

beliefs than by the Fregean thoughts expressed by indexical
sentences embedded behind 'believes that' contexts.

Since

these thoughts can be entertained by only one person,

Evans's analysis of self-attribution entails beliefs that
can be entertained by only one person.

Evans's analysis of self-attribution has certain
advantages.

It preserves the two-place belief relation

without resorting to individual essences or propositional
guises.

But many of the objections raised against first-

person propositions in Chapter Two also apply to Evans's
102

interpretation of Fregean
Fregean

'I'

of sentences

I

'

'

-thoughts

Specifically,

.

thoughts may be construed also as the meanings
in which case the meanings of indexical

sentences containing

*

I

*

are not sharable.

This result

violates our intuitions about the inherently
public
character of linguistic meaning necessary for
explaining

communication between language users.

in addition, there

are also disadvantages to individuating self-attributed

beliefs in such a way that no more than one person can have
that belief.

This consequence also conflicts with our

intuition that the thought content expressed by an utterance
can be shared by more than one person.

Simply put, Evans's analysis of

I

'

'

-thoughts avoids

the difficulties associated with Castaneda's guise theory
and Chisholm's individual essences, but it falls prey to the

same problems created by the inaccessibility and privacy of

first-person propositions.

Because Evans's analysis of

self-attribution forces us to diverge from the traditional

characterization of linguistic meaning and

a

common-sense

understanding of the attribution of belief and other
psychological states,

I

recommend that we continue to

explore other ways of analyzing self-attributed belief.
Perry's three-place relation of belief is a good candidate,
since it does not appear to entail inaccessible linguistic

meanings or belief content.

In the next chapter

I

examine

Perry's analysis of self-attribution and the role it plays
in a puzzle about indexical belief.
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CHAPTER

6

BELIEF STATES

Introduction
In this chapter

I

examine John Perry's solution to a

puzzle about indexical belief.

Perry's formulation of the

messy shopper puzzle and his subsequent solution are worth
considering for the following reasons.

First, Perry's

reasoning is characteristic of the arguments for firstperson propositions advanced by Kretzmann and Grim in

Chapter Two.

But Perry argues that the traditional theory

of propositions is not an adequate solution to the puzzle

he describes, and offers in its place an alternative theory
If Perry's alternative is viable, then it is

of belief.

possible to avoid the difficulties created by private
linguistic meaning and belief content.

In this chapter

argue that Perry has not formulated an adequate

individuation principle for belief states, though these
states play a central role in his solution to the messy
shopper.

The Messv Shopper
1 Perry
In "The Problem of the Essential Indexical"

describes the following example:
once followed a trail of sugar on a
supermarket floor, pushing my cart down
the aisle on one side of a tall counter
and back the aisle on the other, seeking
the shopper with the torn sack to tell
him he was making a mess. With each
trip around the counter the trail became
I
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I

.

,

,

thicker.
But I seemed unable to catch
Finally it dawned on me.
I was the
shopper I was trying to catch. 2

up.

According to Perry this example creates
indexical belief.

a

puzzle about

The puzzle is to explain what the subject

in this example comes to believe when she stops
to

straighten her cart.

For discussion assume that

Dixon, am the shopper described.

I,

Beth

At the outset (time t
x

)

I

believe that:
(1) The shopper with the torn sack is
making a mess.

But

I

do not believe what
(2)

I

am making a mess.

It is only later (at t 2

this time

)

that

and at

(2)

a

change in my beliefs at this

Accordingly, any solution to the puzzle must explain

what new belief

utter

come to believe

To explain the change in my behavior at t 2

requires attributing to me
time.

I

stop to straighten the torn sack of sugar in my

I

own cart.

would express by:

I

I

come to have when

I

am finally prepared to

(2)

Perry's initial proposal is to analyze belief

attributions as two-place relations between
proposition.

At time t^

I

a

believer and a

express my belief by the

following sentence:
(3) I believe that the shopper with the
torn sack is making a mess.

According to Perry's initial proposal, sentence

(3)

may be

analyzed as the relation of belief that holds between the
referent of

'I'

in

(3),

Beth Dixon, and the proposition
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expressed by the embedded clause in (3)—
'the shopper with
the torn sack is making a mess'. At
time t 2 I express my
belief by the sentence:
believe that

I

(4)

Similarly, sentence

(4)

I

am making a mess.

may be analyzed as the relation of

belief between myself and the proposition expressed
by

'

I

am

making a mess' as this clause occurs in (4).
The solution to the puzzle of the messy shopper seems
to require,
'I

in part,

am making a mess'

specifying the proposition expressed by
in

believe at this time.

(4)

in order to characterize what I

But as Perry and others have noted,

this condition is not easily met.

3

Consider the following sentence uttered by me:
believe that Beth Dixon is making

I

(5)

a mess.

It is possible that (5)
I

is true even though

is false,

(4)

if

believe that a person named 'Beth Dixon' is the messy

shopper on the basis of a store announcement, but fail to

believe that
Perhaps

I

am the person referred to by that name.

I

am suffering from amnesia.

In general,

for any name or description,

'T',

that does

not contain an indexical designation and refers to Beth
Dixon,

it is possible for (4)

and

(6)

to differ in truth-

value, where both sentences are uttered by me.
(4)

I

believe that

(6)

I

believe that T is making

I

am making a mess.
a mess.

Perry refers to the embedded occurrence of

'I'

in

(4)

as an

"essential indexical" because it cannot be eliminated for
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any non indexical name or description
of Beth Dixon salva
v eritate
Perry interprets the difficulty in
specifying
the proposition I believe in
(4) as evidence that there is
no proposition I believe in (4).
But this point requires
further support. We might suppose that while
there is no

description that can be substituted salva veritate
for
in

(4),

what

I

'I'

believe can be specified by reference to

a

singular proposition containing the individual Beth Dixon
as
a

constituent.

Perhaps when

making a mess at time t 2/

I

I

come to believe that

I

am

come to believe the de re

proposition that consists of the ordered pair <dixon,

making a mess >
The difficulty with such a proposal, Perry argues, is

that

may believe the singular proposition <dixon, making

I

mess> but fail to believe that
I

I

am making a mess.

a

Suppose

am following the trail of sugar down one aisle and up the

next, still searching for the messy shopper.

Suddenly

I

see

the figure of the messy shopper in a mirror at the end of
the aisle, but fail to recognize this as a reflection of
myself.

I

exclaim,

"She is making a mess," while pointing

to the figure in the mirror.
'she'

Since

I

demonstrate myself,

refers to me in the context of utterance, despite my

failure of recognition.

At this time

I

have a de re belief

in the singular proposition containing Beth Dixon as a

constituent.

But now it appears that my belief in the

singular proposition <dixon, making

a

mess > does not explain

my change of belief at time t 2 since it is possible for me
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to believe this very proposition, but
fail to believe

making

a mess.

I

am

The evidence for this is my failure to

engage in any cart-straightening behavior
at the time when
am disposed to utter 'She is making a mess'.
According to

I

Perry, the messy shopper puzzle is not solved
by appealing

to singular propositions as the objects of belief.

Perry's Solution

rejects the two— place belief relation between

believer and a proposition, and offers in its place
place belief relation between

singular proposition

— where

a

three-

believer, a Russellian

this proposition is an ordered

pair containing an individual and a property
calls a 'belief state'.

a

a

— and

what Perry

On this alternative account, the

'object' of belief is the singular proposition expressed by

an embedded clause containing a singular term.

For example,

suppose it is true that:
(4)

I

believe that

I

am making a mess.

Then the object of my belief is just the singular

proposition consisting of the ordered pair, Beth Dixon and
the property making a mess

.

But the picture is further

complicated by Perry's introduction of "ways of believing"
these singular propositions.

Different ways of believing

propositions correspond to different belief states, which
are individuated by the indexical sentences a believer is

disposed to utter.

Ill

. .

:

.

.

Consider all those shoppers in grocery stores
who are
disposed to utter the sentence 'I am making a
mess'.

Perry

says

The shoppers
are all in a certain
belief state, a state which, given
normal desires and other belief states
they can expect to be in, will lead each
of them to examine his cart.
But,
although they are all in the same belief
state (not the total belief state, of
course)
they do not all have the same
belief (believe the same thing, have the
relation of belief to the same
object) 5
.

.

.

,

Recall Perry's original description of the messy
shopper.

At first it is true that:
(3) I believe that the shopper with the
torn sack is making a mess (in the
context where Beth Dixon is the agent)

Later,

it is true that:
(4)

I

believe that

I

am making a mess

(in the context where Beth Dixon is the

agent)

What new belief do

I

explain the change in

acquire at this later time that will
ray

behavior?

To answer this question

Perry depends on a principle about analyzing belief

attributions of the form displayed by

(3)

and

(4)

endorses the following Belief Principle:
1

is analyzed as
(BP)
I believe that s'
where a is the individual
B a ,p/0
denoted by *1' on a particular occasion

—

of use, and P is a's belief state
individuated by the sentence 'S' that a
is the
is disposed to utter, and
singular proposition expressed by 'S'
where 'S' contains a singular term

denoting

a.

112

He

According to (BP)

,

my belief expressed by

(

3

)

can be

represented as:
3 *)

B dixon,

'The shopper with the torn
sack is making a mess', < dixon, M >•
(

And, my belief expressed by
(4*)

B dixon,

< dixon,

(4)

can be represented as:

am making a mess',

'I

M >•

The representations in (3*) and (4*) reveal that

I

am in a

different belief state at the later time because

I

am

disposed to utter the indexical sentence,
mess'.

belief

'I

am making a

Though my belief state changes, the object of my

— the

singular proposition which is the third term of

the belief relation

— remains

the same.

Hence, on Perry's

solution, it is the change in my belief state at the later

time that explains my change of belief, and why

I

stop to

straighten my cart.

The Individuation of Belief States

According to Perry's solution, appealing to the
singular proposition <dixon, making a mess > as the object of
my belief is insufficient for explaining why

straighten my cart, since

I

object of my belief even at

stop to

I

have this proposition as the
t-^,

when

I

am still following

the trail of sugar "down one aisle and up the next."

Belief

states are playing the crucial explanatory role in the

solution Perry offers because the change in my belief is

explained by a change in my belief state at t 2

«

Therefore,

it is useful to clarify what Perry means by a belief state
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and how these states contribute to explanations
of

behavior.

Perry says:
We use sentences with indexicals or
relativized propositions to individuate
belief states, for the purposes of
classifying believers in ways useful for
explanation and prediction
We
expect all good hearted people in that
state which leads them to say "I am
making a mess" to examine their grocery
carts, no matter what belief they have
in virtue of being in that state.
That
we individuate belief states in this way
doubtless has something to do with the
fact that one criterion for being in the
states we postulate, at least for
articulate sincere adults, is being
disposed to utter the indexical sentence
in question 6
.

.

.

.

Perry proposes that we can use indexical sentences as

a

criterion for individuating the belief states of
individuals, and belief states then may be used in a

psychologically interesting way to explain and predict the
behavior of individuals.

There is at least one major

obstacle to Perry's proposal

— Perry

does not formulate an

adequate individuation principle for belief states.
I

Though

make various attempts to revise Perry's initial proposal,

these revisions are also problematic.

Because there is a

real difficulty in characterizing the notion of a belief
state,

I

argue we cannot use belief states to explain

behavior in the way Perry describes.
According to the passage quoted above,

I

(the messy

shopper) am in the appropriate belief state that leads to

cart-straightening behavior because
the indexical sentence

'I

I

am disposed to utter

am making a mess'.
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And, anyone

who is disposed to utter the indexical sentence
in question
will be in this same belief state. The following
principle
likely captures Perry's recommendations for individuating
Belief States:
(BS) For any individuals x and
y, x and
y are in the same belief state if and
only if x and y are disposed to utter

the same sentences.

The problem with principle (BS)

is that it individuates

belief states too finely to play the explanatory role Perry
describes.

Consider Pierre, who finds himself in

remarkably similar predicament.

a

Pierre initially follows

a

trail of sugar down one aisle of a Parisian market and up
the next, trying to catch up with the messy shopper.

Eventually Pierre realizes that the messy shopper is
himself, and stops to straighten the torn sack of sugar in
his cart.

But, when Pierre stops to straighten his cart, he

does not utter the indexical sentence

'I

am making a mess'.

Nor does Pierre have a disposition to utter this sentence,
for he speaks no English whatsoever.

Hence, according to

Perry's recommendation for individuating belief states
Pierre is not in the same belief state that

I

am in.

(BS)

More

generally, only English speakers can be in the appropriate

belief state leading to cart-straightening behavior.

If

only English speakers can be in the relevant belief state,

then belief states seem unsuitable for the task Perry
describes.

Recall Perry's comment that belief states allow

us to classify believers in ways useful for the explanation

and prediction of behavior.
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There is every reason to think

,

.

.

Perry would want to say that Beth Dixon and
Pierre act
similarly b ecause they are in the same belief
state.

What

is needed is an alternative way of individuating
these

states that will have the result that Pierre and

I

believe

alike
One possibility is to appeal to the linguistic meaning
of the sentences we are disposed to utter.

Although Pierre

may not be disposed to utter the English sentence

'I

am

making a mess', he may be disposed to utter a French
translation of this sentence that means the same thing.
There is evidence that Perry accepts the account of sentence

meaning proposed by David Kaplan in the manuscript
Demonstratives

.

7

In a footnote to "The Problem of the

Essential Indexical," Perry says about his own solution to
the messy shopper:

This two-tiered structure of belief
states and propositions believed will
remind the reader familiar with David
Kaplan's Demonstratives 8 of his system
of characters and contents.
This is no
accident, for my approach to the problem
of the essential indexical was formed by
using the distinction as found in
earlier versions of Kaplan's work to try
and find a solution to the problem as
articulated by Castaneda. 9
r

In the next section

1

I

examine Kaplan's distinction between

character and content in order to formulate an appropriate
revision to (BS)
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Character and Content

Kaplan distinguishes two kinds of meaning that apply to
sentences in

a

speech taken in

context, or
a

context

.

.

any meaningful part of

where context is an ordered 4-

,

tuple consisting of a world, time, place, and agent.
Kaplan,

For

indexicals as well as all other singular terms are

directly referential.

This means they refer directly to

individuals without mediation by some Fregean sense or
concept.

The propositions expressed by sentences containing

such singular terms will be singular propositions containing

individuals as constituents.

The content of an indexical

expression will be the individual referred to in

particular context.

And,

a

likewise, we can determine the

content of an indexical sentence such as

'

I

am tired' by

taking this sentence together with the context of
utterance.

In the case where Beth Dixon is the agent, and

the rest of the contextual features are specified, the

content of this sentence will be the singular proposition

consisting of the ordered pair, the individual Beth Dixon
and the property being tired

.

or <dixon, being tired >.

We

may want to evaluate the truth or falsity of that sentence
in different possible worlds and times, given the content it

has in the actual world where Beth Dixon is the agent.

In

this case the content of this sentence in a context can be

represented by a content function that takes possible worlds
and times as arguments, and yields a truth-value as value.

The value will be true in just those worlds and times where
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Beth Dixon is tired.

expression in

a

Similarly, the content of any

context can be represented as that function

from circumstances of evaluation (world-time pairs) to the

appropriate extension, either individuals, sets of n-tuples,
or truth-values.
The second kind of meaning Kaplan distinguishes is

character.

Character is what determines the content of an

expression or sentence in varying contexts.

The character

of an expression in a context can also be represented by a

function

—a

function from a particular context to content.

For example, the character of the indexical expression

'I'

in the context where Beth Dixon is the agent, can be

represented by that function that takes the context of

utterance as argument and yields

a

content as value, where

the content of this expression is represented as that

function from circumstances of evaluation to the appropriate

extension

— in

this case, the individual Beth Dixon.

Kaplan

sometimes speaks of the character of expressions and
sentences in an abbreviated way, as functions from contexts
to extensions 11
.

So we might think of the character of the

indexical expression 'I', as that function that takes

possible contexts as arguments and yields the speaker of
that context as value.

Similarly, we might represent the

character of the indexical sentence

'I

am making a mess' as

that function that takes possible contexts as arguments, and

yields as value a unique proposition.

The character

function for indexical sentences and expressions is
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sensitive to context, since the content of that sentence
or

expression will change relative to the agent of the context
in which the sentence occurs.

We are now in a better position to specify the sense in
whi-C-h

Pierre and

I

believe alike.

Pierre and

1

have the

same beliefs because we are both disposed to utter a

sentence with the same character.

The character function in

question can be described in the following way:
(A) That function that takes any
context, c, as argument and yields as
value a function from worlds and times
to truth-values, such that given a
particular world and time, the value is
true if and only if the speaker or
writer of c is making a mess in that
world and time.

We might formulate a revised individuation principle
for belief states in the following way:
(BS2
For any individuals x and y, x and
y are in the same belief state if and
only if x and y are disposed to utter
)

sentences with the same character.

Though

I

am disposed to utter the indexical sentence

'I

am

making a mess', and Pierre is disposed to utter the French
sentence 'Je fais un gachis', we are both in the same belief
state because the sentences we are disposed to utter have
the character described in

(A)

character function described in

Though we can use the
(A)

as a way of

individuating belief states, it is not yet apparent how

being in a particular belief state individuated by
character contributes to explanations and predictions of
behavior.
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The Cognitive Significance of Character

Kaplan indicates that the cognitive significance of

character is intimately linked to the role that character
plays in explanations of behavior.

For example, in the

following paragraph Kaplan quotes from Perry's article
"Frege on Demonstratives," 12 substituting his own

terminology for Perry's:
Why should we care under what character
someone apprehends a thought, so long as
he does? I can only sketch the barest
suggestion of an answer here. we use
the manner of presentation, the
character, to individuate psychological
states, in explaining and predicting
action.
It is the manner of
presentation, the character, and not the
thought apprehended, that is tied to
human action. When you and I have
beliefs under the common character of 'A
bear is about to attack me', we behave
similarly. We both roll up in a ball
and try to be as still as possible.
Different thoughts apprehended, same
character, same behavior. When you and
I both apprehend that I am about to be
attacked by a bear, we behave
differently.
I roll up in a ball, you
Same thought
run to get help.
apprehended, different characters,
different behaviors. 13
If we want to use belief states to explain and predict

behavior, as both Perry and Kaplan recommend, then we cannot

individuate belief states according to
case where

I

(

BS2

)

.

Consider the

unknowingly spill sugar from my cart in an

aisle of the grocery store.

Suppose that

sentence 'Je fais un gachis' because

I

I

utter the

am pretending to be

French and recently overheard this phrase uttered by

French speaker.

Yet,

I

a

do not understand a word of the
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French language.

In this case

the character described in

but for the wrong reasons.

(A)

According to (BS2) Pierre and

utter a sentence that has

I

I

are in the same belief

state, but being in this state does not lead to any cart-

straightening behavior on my part.

Any plausible

individuation principle for belief states will individuate
these states in such

a

way that we can use these states to

specify sufficient conditions for certain kinds of behavior
on the part of sincere, articulate adults.

We might try revising

(

BS2 ) to reguire that the

believer understand the character of whatever sentence she
utters or is disposed to utter.

understand the French sentence

To reguire that
I

I

utter in order to be in the

appropriate belief state is to require that

I

know the

linguistic conventions governing the use of that sentence.

Kaplan says:
The character of an expression is set by
linguistic conventions and, in turn,
determines the content of the expression
Because character is
in every context.
what is set by linguistic conventions,
it is natural to think of it as meaning
in the sense of what is known by the
competent language user. 14

Our previous individuation principle for belief states can
be revised to avoid cases where an individual fails to be

cognizant of the linguistic conventions (i.e. character)
that governs her utterance.
For any individuals x and y, x and
are
in the same belief state if and
y
x and y are disposed to utter
if
only
sentences with the same character, and x
(BS3)
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,

and y understand the character of the
sentences they are disposed to utter.
It is unrealistic to require that
competent language

users be able to state the character function
of the
sentences they utter or are disposed to utter,
since native
speakers may be competent language users but not
know what a
function is. Understanding the character of an
expression
may be construed as the simple requirement that
speakers be

cognizant of the meaning rules of the expressions they use.
For example, Kaplan describes the character of

meaning rule:

'I'

as the

'I'

refers to the speaker or writer of a

particular occurrence of that word. 15
When any good-hearted shopper finds herself disposed to

utter a sentence that has the character described in
and the shopper understands that

'I'

(A)

refers to the speaker

or writer of the sentence she is disposed to utter, then she
is in the belief state that leads to cart-straightening

behavior.

Part of the explanation why the shopper

straightens her cart is that she understands the meaning
rule for

'I'

— the

expression that occurs in the sentence she

is disposed to utter.

Despite its initial plausibility, there are still

whole range of cases that create problems for
example, suppose that

I

(

BS3

a

For

)

am pushing my cart up one aisle and

down the next in a grocery store.

I

am approached by the

store manager, who offers me a large sum of money if

loudly utter the sentence

'I

am making a mess'.

I

will

It seems

the manager is under a great deal of pressure by the owner
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of the store to find the messy shopper.

And, unable to do

he has settled on coercing an admission of
guilt from an
innocent shopper.
I accept the money and utter the
sentence

so,

'I

am making a mess'.

meaning rules for
So,

according to

*

(

I

in doing so, I also understand the

and for the entire sentence

'

BS3

)

,

I

I

utter.

am in the same belief state that

leads Pierre and the original messy shopper to straighten
^-heir carts.

Yet in this case

my cart because
shopper.

I

I

do not stop to straighten

do not believe that

It must be that either

I

state as these other shoppers, and

am the messy

I

am not in the same belief
(

BS3

does not yield an

)

acceptable individuation principle for belief states.

Or,

being in a particular belief state is unrelated to the

subsequent behavior

a

person performs.

Neither of these

options would be acceptable for Perry, so we might try to
revise

(

BS3

)

to avoid this counter-example.

It is not

obvious how to do so.
One possiblity is to include in (BS3

)

a

sincerity

condition that puts believers in the same belief state if
and only if they are disposed to sincerely utter sentences

with the same character, and understand the character of
these sentences.

Perry indicates something of the sort when

he says:

That we individuate belief states in
this way doubtless has something to do
with the fact that one criterion for
being in the states we postulate, at
least for articulate sincere adults is
being disposed to utter the indexical
sentence in question. 16
.
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We are naturally inclined to say about the
example just
raised, even though

mess',

I

I

utter the sentence

'I

am making a

do not sincerely utter this sentence.

It is difficult to interpret 'sincerely'

in this

context without making the individuation principle
circular.
In the example described it seems my utterance is
not

sincere because
even though
that

I

I

I

do not mean what

utter

'I

I

say.

am making a mess',

am making a mess because

I

(

BS3

)

I

do not believe

have other reasons for

producing this utterance, i.e., greed.

recommendation for revising

In other words,

In effect, the

is the following:

(BS4) For any individuals x and y, x and
y are in the same belief state if and
only if x and y are disposed to utter
sentences with the same character; and x
and y understand the character of the
sentences they are disposed to utter;
and x and y believe what is expressed by
the sentences they are disposed to

utter.

According to (BS4)

,

any two people are in the belief

state that leads to cart-straightening behavior if and only
if they utter 'I am making a mess', understand the character

of this sentence, and believe what they say.

proposal is circular.

But this

It will not help to individuate

psychological states by the beliefs a person has, since
those beliefs are what we are trying to characterize by

formulating an individuation principle to begin with.
Moreover, this counter-example is not an isolated case.

There are any number of inappropriate reasons for being

disposed to utter sentences, including various types of

124

coercion (such as torture or blackmail),
desiring to impress
a friend, wanting to take the
blame, duplicity, to name a
few.
These reasons are too varied and numerous
to exclude
all such cases by a ceteris paribus
clause attached
to

(BS3)

.

I

suspect all inappropriate reasons for being

disposed to utter a sentence are inappropriate
because the
believer is, in some sense, insincere about what
she

asserts.

But

I

see no way of explaining insincerity other

than by saying the believer fails to believe what she
is

disposed to utter.

Including a condition that individuals

actually believe what they are disposed to utter in any
individuation principle for belief states will create

circularity in that principle of the sort displayed by
(BS4)

.

Perhaps an adequate individuation principle for

belief states can be formulated, but Perry has not done so.
And, despite my efforts to make

(

BS3

)

plausible, it is not

obvious how to circumvent counter-examples involving

coercion and other inappropriate reasons for being disposed
to utter sentences. 17
By Perry's own account it is belief states that play a

psychological role in explanations of behavior.
my belief state changes since, at this time,

At time t 2
am disposed

I

to utter a sentence with a different character.

If my

belief is identified with my belief state, then there is
sense in which my belief changes at time t 2

.

a

The change in

my belief state will explain my subsequent change of

behavior at time t 2

.

The difficulty with Perry's solution
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is that he requires the notion of a
belief state to explain

the puzzle of the messy shopper.

Yet we have just seen that

Perry has not formulated a plausible individuation
principle
for belief states, nor is it obvious how to
do so.
This is
not a devasting criticism of Perry, but it
indicates that

Perry's proposal for analyzing indexical belief leaves
much
to be explained.
Perry himself seems to acknowledge this

when he says about the individuation of belief states: "A
good philosophy of mind should explain this in detail; my
aim is merely to get clear about what it is that needs

explaining ." 18

Until "a good philosophy of mind" has

explained the notion of a belief state, Perry is better off

relinquishing his attempt to use belief states in
psychological theory of behavior.

a

general

Perry does not say enough

about how to characterize these states, given the important
role he assigns them in his analysis of self-attribution.

Though Perry's analysis of belief does not leave us
with a plausible psychology of behavior, it has an advantage
over the two-place relations of belief.

Perry's proposal

does not entail private linguistic meanings.

His three-

place relation of belief allows us to say that the meanings
of indexical sentences are singular propositions, which are

publicly accessible entities.

In this way,

the semantics of

belief attributions is distinguished from the psychology of
belief.

This is a promising strategy for avoiding the

privileged access of two-place relations of belief discussed
in Chapters Two-Five.
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CHAPTER

7

SELF-ATTRIBUTED PROPERTIES

Introduction
In this chapter

I

examine the theories of self-

attribution advanced by Roderick Chisholm in The First
P erson

1
,

and David Lewis in "Attitudes De Dicto and De Se.

1,2

Both Chisholm and Lewis analyze de se belief as a two-place

relation between a believer and a property.

I

argue that

privileged access is not entailed by these property
theories, though there are other difficulties that arise for

each of the specific proposals discussed by Chisholm and

Lewis

Chisholm and Direct Attribution
One of Chisholm's projects in The First Person is to

show that belief about oneself

belief

— cannot

belief.

be reduced

to,

— what

Lewis calls "de se "

either de dicto or de re

To this end Chisholm introduces the following

example taken from Mach's Analysis of Sensations

3
.

Not long ago, after a trying railway
journey by night, and much fatigued, I
got into an omnibus, just as another
gentleman appeared at the other end.
"What shabby pedagogue is that, that has
It was
just entered?" thought I.
myself; opposite me hung a large mirror.
The physiognomy of my class,
accordingly, was better known to me than
my own 4

Chisholm goes on to say about Mach's example:
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:

.

,

As Mach entered the bus, then, he
believed with respect to Mach and
therefore with respect to himself that
he was a shabby pedagogue, but he did
not believe himself to be a shabby
pedagogue. The experience might have
made him say: " That man is a shabby
pedagogue." But prior to his discovery
of the mirror it would not have led him
to say: "I am a shabby pedagogue.

—

—

— —

Chisholm uses this example and others like it to
illustrate the logical relations that hold between certain
kinds of sentence constructions.

In particular, he wishes

to distinguish the de dicto and de re locutions from the de
se locution.

These are exhibited by the following

sentences
(P) The tallest man believes that the
tallest man is wise.
(Q) There is an x such that x is
identical with the tallest man and x is
believed by x to be wise.
(S) The tallest man believes that he
himself is wise.

Of interest here are the logical relations that hold between

belief de se exhibited by the 'he himself' locution in
belief de re represented by

represented by
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

(P)

(S)

,

and belief de dicto

(Q)

Chisholm claims the following:

does not imply P;
P does not imply S;
S implies Q;
Q does not imply S

S

6

.

According to Chisholm,

(S)

does not imply

(P)

because

it is possible that the tallest man believes that he himself
is wise but fails to believe that the tallest man is wise,

if he does not know this fact about himself
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— that

he is the

tallest man.

The implication from

the very same reason.

(P)

The claim that

to
(Q)

can fail for

(S)

fails to imply

seems the most problematic, according to
Chisholm.

This is

the case illustrated by Mach's shabby
pedagogue example.
this case it is true that Mach believes of
the person he
sees in the mirror, that

pedagogue'.

1

(s)

In

that person is a shabby

But since he doesn't recognize 'that person' as

himself, he cannot sincerely say

shabby pedagogue'.

'I

believe that

I

am a

Therefore, it is not true that Mach

believes that he himself is

shabby pedagogue.

a

In The First Person Chisholm analyzes belief as a two-

place relation between a believer and

a

property.

Chisholm

wants to characterize this relation so that it accounts for
the logical relations between the sentence constructions

exhibited by

(P)

,

(Q)

and

(S)

.

Chisholm's project is to

take the de se form of belief as primary, and to define the
de re and de dicto forms of belief in terms of it.

Believing must be construed as a
relation between a believer and some
other thing; this much is essential to
any theory of belief. What kind of
thing, then? There are various
possibilities: sentences, propositions
or states of affairs, properties,
individual things. The simplest
conception, I suggest, is one which
construes believing as a relation
involving a believer and a property-a
property which he may be said to
attribute to himself. Then the various
senses of believing may be understood by
reference to this simple conception 7
.

The notion of 'direct attribution' is central to

Chisholm's analysis of belief.
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It operates as an undefined

primitive in Chisholm's conceptual scheme,
but the following
-'ipl®s are

P-*-'-^-^ <

(PI)

conditions for its user
For every x, every y and every z,
z to y, then x

if x directly attributes
is identical with y. 8
(P2)

For every x, every y and every z,
z to y, then z

if x direcly attributes
is a property. 9

Chisholm goes on to offer a definition of

'x

believes that

he himself is F' in terms of direct attribution:
(Dl) x believes that he himself is F
=Df. The property of being F is such
that x directly attributes it to x. 10

When
I

I

form a belief about an object other than myself,

indirectly attribute a property to that object.

comes about in the following way:

object of my belief,
myself.

I

This

In order to make you the

must single you out in relation to

can do this by directly attributing a property to

I

myself that implies there is a certain identifying relation,
R,

which is such that you are the thing to which

For example, suppose

I

bear

I

form the belief that you are wise.

In order to make you the object of my belief

I

you out by means of some identifying relation

— such

relation might be 'talking with', or
The property that

I

R.

'x is

must single
a

talking with y'.

directly attribute to myself is one such

that it entails there is just one thing to whom
and that thing is wise.

I

am talking

When these conditions obtain,

I

indirectly attribute to you the property of being wise.

Chisholm's definition of indirect attribution is as follows:
D2
y is such that, as the thing that x
bears R to, x indirectly attributes to
(

)
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,

it the property of being F =Df. x bears
R to y and only to y; and x directly
attributes to x a property which entails
the property of bearing R to just one
thing and to a thing that is F. 11

According to Chisholm, we can abbreviate

(D2)

in the

following way:
(D3)

y is such that x indirectly
to it the property of being F
is a relation R such that x
attributes to y, as the thing
bears R, the property of

attributes
=Df. There
indirectly
to which x
being F. 12

Chisholm goes on to say about indirect attribution that

a

believer can specify a certain identifying relation that
singles out her object of belief as the thing to which she

bears this identifying relation. 13

When Mach sees himself in the mirror without

recognizing his own reflection and says,

'That man is a

shabby pedagogue', Mach attributes to himself the property
of being a shabby pedagogue, but he does so only by

indirectly attributing this property to himself.

according to (D2)

there is an identifying relation that

Mach bears only to himself
the end of the bus'
a

So,

— and

— perhaps

it is

'x

perceives y at

Mach directly attributes to himself

property that entails there is only one person he sees at

the end of the bus, and this person is a shabby pedagogue.

When Mach finally realizes that he is seeing his own

reflection in a mirror, he is in a position to say
shabby pedagogue'.

'

I

am a

We can then truthfully say of Mach that

he believes that he himself is a shabby pedagogue.

We can

analyze Mach's belief according to Chisholm's definition
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.

.

The property of being a shabby pedagogue
is such that
Mach directly attributes this property to
himself.
(Dl)

.

Now we are in a better position to see how
well
Chisholm's notions of direct and indirect
attribution
explain puzzles about self-attribution.

Perry's Puzzle
One way of testing the adequacy of Chisholm's property

theory of belief is to see how well it explains Perry's
puzzle of the messy shopper.
example.

Recall the facts of the

At t x it is true that:
(1) I believe that the shopper with the
torn sack is making a mess (uttered by
Beth Dixon)

At a later time
shopper, and

I

I

come to realize that

I

am the messy

stop to straighten the torn sack in my cart.

At t 2 it is true that:
I believe that I am making a mess
(uttered by Beth Dixon)

(2)

What

I

come to believe at t 2 should explain my change in

behavior on any plausible theory of belief.
According to Chisholm's theory, the object of my belief
at

and t 2 is not a proposition.

Instead,

(1)

and

(2)

are

analyzed as two-place relations between a believer and an

attributed property.

On this construal the property

directly attributed is the content of the attribution, and
the thing to which the property is attributed is the object
of the attribution. 14

In sentences

(1)

and

(2)

of my belief attribution remains the same, since
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the object
I

am the

thing to which

property is attributed in both

a

The difference between what

I

believe at

(1)

and (2).

and t 2 must,

therefore, be represented by the content of my belief, or
the property that

I

directly attribute to Beth Dixon.

At t^ it is not true that:
Beth Dixon believes that she herself

(3)

is making a mess.

On the basis of this fact we cannot analyze

(1)

as a case of

Beth Dixon directly attributing to herself the property of

making a mess.

For Chisholm, the correct analysis of

(1)

involves specifying that Beth Dixon (B.D.) indirectly

attributes to herself the property of making

According to

(D2)

a mess.

this is to say that:

(la) There is an identifying relation,
R, that B.D. bears to B.D. and only to

B.D., and B.D. directly attributes to
herself a property that entails the
property of bearing R to just one thing
and to a thing that is making a mess.
In this case it is possible that the identifying relation,
R,

that B.D. bears to herself is something like,

'x is

following y's sugar trail'.
At t 2

,

when B.D. believes that she herself is making

mess, we can analyze

(2)

a

as:

(2a) B.D. directly attributes to herself
the property of making a mess.

The fact that B.D. stops to straighten her sack at the

later time is one that we ought to be able to explain by

appealing to a change in B.D.'s beliefs at t 2

.

In

Chisholm's terminology, B.D.'s belief at t^ and t 2 is
specified by the content of her attribution at those times.
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At t lf the content of B.D.'s belief is
the property she
directly attributes to herself the property
of following
exactly one person leaving a sugar trail, and
the person
making a mess. But at t
the content of B.D.'s belief is
2
the property she directly attributes to herself
the

—

,

—

property of making a mess.

So it seems Chisholm's theory

does allow us to explain the change in my behavior by

appealing to the fact that
t2

,

I

acquire a different belief at

but only on the assumption that a difference in the

properties

I

directly attribute reflects

a

difference in my

belief.

Inaccessible Beliefs?
In Chapter Two,
a

I

described an "inaccessible belief" as

belief that can be entertained by only one person.

According to the Basic Argument, when the object of belief
(in the traditional terminology)

is a first-person

proposition, only the agent of a first-person indexical

sentence can entertain the belief identified with that
first-person proposition.

Does Chisholm's analysis of self-

attribution also entail inaccessible beliefs?
section

I

In this

consider whether Chisholm's property theory of

belief commits him to any kind of inaccessibility.

I

argue

that it does not.

Consider the following account that seems to suggest

inaccessibility does follow from Chisholm's analysis of
self-attribution.

In order to explain the puzzle about the
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—
messy shopper we identified my belief at
time t 2 with the
property I directly attribute making a mess
Another
individual may directly attribute this property
to herself
if she also believes that she herself is
making a mess.
.

But, according to Chisholm, no one but

attribute a property to myself.

I

can directly

no one but

I

can form

the same belief that constitutes my belief when

I

directly

attribute the property making

a

So,

mess

.

For example, consider

the following variation on Perry's puzzle.

Suppose another shopper in the store also comes to
realize at t 2 that

I

am making a mess.

Perhaps Mary points

to me and utters the following sentence:
(4)

You are making a mess.

If so, we can use (D3) to analyze her belief.
(4a) There is a relation R, such that
Mary indirectly attributes to B.D. as
the thing to which Mary bears this
relation, the property of making a mess.

Suppose the identifying relation R that Mary bears only to
me is the relation 'standing next to'.

In this case Mary

directly attributes to herself the following property:
standing next to exactly one person and to a person making
mess

.

As we have already seen, the property that

attribute to myself at t 2 is: being
mess

a

I

directly

person who is making

.

From this it might be thought that Chisholm's theory
has the following consequence:

Even though Mary refers to

me when she utters 'You are making a mess', and

myself when

I

utter

'I

I

refer to

am making a mess', we believe
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a

a

different things because we directly
attribute to ourselves
different properties. The content of our
beliefs is not the
same.
I

in general, no one other than myself
can believe what

believe about Beth Dixon when

I

utter

'I

am making a

mess', because, according to (Pi) no one
but

attribute the property making

a

I

can directly

mess to myself.

Other

people can indirectly attribute that property to me,
but
indirect attribution will always involve the believer

directly attributing some property that entails an
identifying relation that the believer bears to me.
other words,

a

In

person other than Beth Dixon must always

attribute mess-making to Beth Dixon by means of some
identifying relation.
I

But this is not so in the case where

directly attribute the property making a mess

,

since, as

Chisholm puts it:

... in directly attributing a property
to oneself one need not thereby single
out an identifying property of
oneself 15
.

Hence,

if attributed properties are what is believed, then

no one but

uttering
what

I

can believe what

I

'I

am making a mess'.

I

believe about myself when
There is a sense in which

believe about myself is inaccessible to others.

Though it is tempting to charge Chisholm with some

version of inaccessibility or privileged access, it is wrong
to do so.

This charge depends on two claims:

According to Chisholm, belief content is to be
identified with the property attributed; and
(a)

Mary and I directly attribute different
properties to ourselves when I utter 'I am making
(b)
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mess', and Mary utters 'You are making a mess'
while pointing to me.
So,

the content of my belief is different from the content

of Mary's belief.

The appropriate response to this is to note that there
are different ways to individuate belief content.

Mary and

I

Though

each directly attribute different properties to

ourselves, Mary indirectly

property that

I

attributes to me the very same

directly attribute to myself.

Mary

indirectly attributes to me the property making a mess
I

directly attribute the property making

property--same belief content.

a

mess

,

and

Same

.

The difference in this way

of individuating Mary's belief lies in identifying her

belief content with the property she indirectly attributes
to me.

There is no reason to assume that belief content

must always be individuated by the property that is

directly attributed, rather than indirectly attributed.

In

fact, Chisholm suggests otherwise in the following passage:

More generally, whenever we have
indirect attribution, then the believer
attributes a property to the object, as
the thing to which he bears a certain
identifying relation. We may call the
property thus attributed the content of
16
the indirect attribution
.

.

.

One advantage of Chisholm's property theory of belief
is that it allows us to avoid the kind of privileged access

associated with two-place propositional theories of belief.
This is accomplished by locating indexicality in the

attitude itself, rather than in

a

property or

a

proposition.

On Chisholm's account, the reflexivity of 'she herself'
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appears as a condition of direct attribution—
each person
can directly attribute a property only to
herself.
But,

as

we have seen, this will not affect the
accessibility of
belief content if beliefs are individuated by
the property
that is either directly or indirectly attributed.

There is a more serious difficulty for Chisholm's

property theory.

At one point in The First Person

f

Chisholm

suggests that one might provide a uniform analysis of

propositional attitudes other than 'believes'.
introducing the definition of
F'

'x

After

believes that he himself is

in terms of direct attribution (Dl)

,

Chisholm goes on to

say:

What we have said about attribution and
believing may be extended to the other
intentional attitudes and, indeed, to
thought itself.
Let us consider the
latter briefly.
The expression 'entertaining' is
sometimes taken to refer to the generic
sense of thinking. Entertainment is
then recognized as being an intentional
attitude taking the same objects as
believing, but not involving the
doxastic commitment that is essential to
believing.
But if the primary form of
believing is the direct attribution of a
property to oneself, then the primary
form of 'entertainment' is analogous.
It is that phenomenon which is
considering oneself as having a certain
property or, alternatively put,
thinking of oneself as having a certain
property.
If I am trying to make a
decision as to which direction to travel
in, I consider myself as travelling in
one direction and then consider myself
I will be the
as travelling in another.
object of such considering and the
property I consider myself as having
will be the content 1
.

.

—

'

.
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In this passage Chisholm explains how we are to
extend

the kind of analysis provided by direct attribution to
the

intentional attitude 'entertain'.

But it is not obvious how

to extrapolate from 'belief' and 'entertain', to attitudes

like 'fear',

'wish', or 'hope', to name a few.

illustrate the difficulty here,

consider

I

a

To

number of ways

to analyze the following locution:
(5)

x fears that she herself is F.

First note that any definitional analysis of

contain the attitude 'fear' without such
circular.

a

(5)

cannot

definition being

This seems fairly obvious, but it is tempting to

suppose that the most straightforward way of handling a

sentence like:

'Tom fears that he himself will fail the

is to say that Tom fears oneself to have a certain

exam'

property

— namely,

failing the exam

.

When analyzing this

sentence we are prevented from using the attribution
'fearing oneself' or 'oneself fearing' because the attitude
'fear'

now appears also in the analysis itself, making the

definition circular.
of

(5)

'fear'

Perhaps what we need in the analysis

is another attitude that captures the meaning of

in much the same way that 'consider' captures the

meaning of 'entertain'.
If Tom fears that he himself will fail the exam, then

the property failing the exam is not a property that Tom

wants to attribute to himself.
analyzed as:
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So,

perhaps

(5)

can be

:

.

(6) x fears that he himself is F =Df.
the property of being F is such
that’x
does not want to attribute it to x.

The analysis in

(6)

may capture Tom's case of fearing since

it makes sense to think that Tom does
not want to fail the
exam, but there are other instances of
the locution in (5)

that are not explained by the definition given
in

(6)

For example, consider the case where Mary
voluntarily

chooses to present her oral report on the second day
of
class.

On that day Mary fears that she herself is next (to

present her oral report)

.

Mary may have

a

certain amount of

apprehension or dread about being the next person to face
the class, but she still wants to be next.

volunteered to speak on this particular day.

In fact,

she

In this case,

it is true Mary fears that she herself is next, but false

that the property of being next is such that Mary does not

want to attribute it to herself.
If we try to provide an analysis of (5) that

accommodates the case involving Mary, there are other
instances of

(5)

that will be counter-examples to this

revised definition.

For example, when Mary fears that she

herself is next, the context of the example suggests that
she is apprehensive.

This is the sense of 'fear' that comes

closest to capturing her attitude.
following alternative definition of

We might try the
(5)

(7) x fears that she herself is F =Df.
the property of being F is such that x
is apprehensive of attributing it to x.
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.

The analysis in

(7)

is awkward sounding,

case it is designed to explain.

even for the

We ordinarily think that

Mary is apprehensive of the state of
affairs of being next,
and not apprehensive of attributing to
herself the property
of being next.
Putting this aside, the main problem with
(7) is that there are instances of the locution
in
(5)

that

clearly cannot be analyzed in terms of the attitude
'apprehension

1

.

For example, suppose Todd is held hostage

by homicidal terrorists who have been systematically
killing
off each member of the hostage group.

Todd fears that he

himself will die, but it would be inaccurate to say that
Todd is merely apprehensive of attributing the property of

dying to himself.

Todd is terrified of dying, and to

explain his attitude of fear any less strongly would be to

misrepresent his state of mind in this context.
'Apprehension' is surely not strong enough to serve as a

definitional analysis of this particular instance of
In general,
'x

I

(5)

suggest that there will be no analysis of

fears that she herself is

F'

that will capture the

meaning of all instances of this locution.

Even if we could

settle on another attitude that covered the majority of ways
in which we ordinarily use this locution,

I

maintain there

is no guarantee that further analyses can be found for other

attitudes such as 'desiring',
Thus,

'hoping'

'loathing', etc.

it is difficult to see how Chisholm's analysis of

'entertaining' can be easily extended to other intentional

attitudes
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.

.

Perhaps what is required is an analysis that is more
like Chisholm's treatment of 'x believes that he himself
is
F'.

In definition D.

1

,

'direct attribution' is introduced

as an undefined primitive that functions as the analysis of
^ believes that he himself is x'

.

Why not introduce

another such primitive to analyze the locution in (5)?

Our

analysis might look as follows:
(8) x fears that she herself is F =Df.
the property of being F is such that x
f-attributes it to x.

The following are conditions governing the use of

attributes', analogous to Chisholm's (PI) and (P2)

'

f-

.

(PI*) For every x, every y and every z,
if x f-attributes x to y, then x is

identical with y.
( P2 *
For every x,
if x f-attributes
)

z

every y and every z,
to y, then z is a

property
In principle there is nothing objectionable about

introducing the undefined primitive 'f-attributes' to
analyze the locution in

But if this strategy were

(5)

generalized we would have to introduce

a

new primitive term

in the analysis of every intentional attitude.

I

suspect

this is not what Chisholm had in mind when he claimed, "What
we have said about attribution and believing may be extended
to the other intentional

attitudes.

.

.

18

The main objection to such a strategy is that we have

said nothing about the analysis in
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(8)

that explains how it

is different from 'directly attribute',

About 'direct

attribution' Chisholm says:
We presuppose two things about the
abilities or faculties of believers.
First, a believer can take himself as
his intentional object; that is to say,
he can direct his thoughts upon himself.
And, secondly, in so doing, grasps or
conceives a certain property which he
attributes to himself. 1 ^
If the analysis of 'x fears that she herself is F'

is not

identical to the analysis of 'x believes that she herself is
F',

then we should be able to explain how

'

f-attributes

'

is

different from the above account Chisholm provides of
'direct attribution'.
'x

Since our earlier attempts to analyze

fears that she herself is

F'

by means of some other

attitude were unsuccessful, it is not clear what more can be
said to explicate this locution.

Chisholm indicates that there is

In summary,
a

although

straightforward way of

extending his property theory analysis to propositional
attitudes other than 'believes', it is not obvious how to do
so.

This is a disadvantage of Chisholm's theory.

Lewis and Self-Ascription

Both Chisholm and Lewis analyze simple subject-

predicate sentences containing 'believes' as two-place
relations between an individual and

attributed to oneself via

a

a

property that is

special relation.

Where

Chisholm calls this relation 'direct attribution', Lewis
refers to properties that are 'self-ascribed'.
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Lewis's strategy in "Attitudes De Dicto
and De Se'' 20 is
to argue that: (l) self-ascribed
properties will serve as
the objects of belief as well as
propositions, where
propostions are construed as sets of possible
worlds, and
(2)

in some cases properties will do as the
objects of

belief but propositions will not.

By 'property' Lewis means

"the set of exactly those possible beings, actual
or not,

that have the property in question." 21

Lewis defends his

first claim by pointing out a one-to-one correspondence

between all propositions and some properties.

For any set

of worlds there will correspond to this set the property of

inhabiting some world in that set.

So, whenever it is

appropriate to designate a proposition as the object of an
attitude, we can just as easily assign the corresponding

property instead.
Lewis defends the second, and more controversial of his
two claims, by considering examples involving indexical
belief. These examples suggest that belief cannot be

analyzed as a relation between a believer and

a

proposition.

Specifically, Lewis considers Perry's example of an
amensiac, Rudolph Lingens, who is lost in the Stanford
Library.

No matter how many books he reads describing his

own life history and many detailed accounts of the Stanford
Library, he still will not find his way out until he is

ready to say, "This place is aisle five, floor six, of Main
Library, Stanford; and

I

am Rudolph Lingens."

about Lingens:
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Lewis says

Book learning will help Lingens locate
himself in logical space
the more
he reads, the more propositions he
believes, and the more he is in a
position to self-ascribe properties of
inhabiting such-and-such a kind of
world.
But none of this, by itself, can
guarantee that he knows where in the
world he is. He needs to locate himself
not only in logical space but also in
ordinary space. He needs to selfascribe the property of being in aisle
five, floor six, of Main Library,
Stanford; and this is not one of the
properties that corresponds to a
proposition 22
.

.

.

.

On the basis of this example and others, Lewis argues

that some beliefs cannot be understood as propositional, but
can be understood as the self-ascription of properties.

He

further proposes that all belief be analyzed as the self-

ascription of properties.

However, in those cases where no

indexical belief is involved, the self-ascription of

property entails just that the believer inhabit

a

a

world

where she has that property.
Like Chisholm's theory, the analysis of 'believes'

Lewis offers is motivated by the problems peculiar to
indexical belief.

So,

it is not surprising that Lewis's

account can be used to explain Perry's puzzle of the messy
shopper.
At

I

believe that the shopper with the torn sack is

making a mess.

According to Lewis, my belief involves the

self-ascription of the property; inhabiting a world wh ere
the shopper with the torn sack is making a mess

when

I

learn that

I

am making a mess,

the property: making a mess

.
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I

.

At t 2

,

merely self-ascribe

On this account, the property

I

self-ascribe at t 2 is different from the property

ascribe at t^, since there are worlds where
not the shopper with the torn sack.
the belief

form at t 2

I

as. a

I

I

self-

exist but

I

am

Lewis would describe

case where a proposition will

not do as the object of my belief but a self-ascribed

property will.
Because

self-ascribe a different property at t 2

I

,

we

seem able to explain my change in belief, and also, to

explain why
time.

I

I

stopped to straighten my cart at the later

self-ascribe a different property at t 2 than

self-ascribe at

I

Therefore, my believe at t 2 is

t]_.

different from my belief at

t]_.

Individuating Beliefs
In this section

I

argue that Lewis's theory of belief

does not entail privileged access for the agents of
indexical sentences, though it is tempting to charge Lewis

with some version of inaccessibility.

Consider the

following analysis Lewis offers of 'belief de re'

:

A subject ascribes property X to
individual Y if and only if the subject
ascribes X to Y under some description Z
such that either (1) Z captures the
essence of Y, or (2) Z is a relation of
acquaintance that the subject bears to
Y.Z3
(DR)

Lewis finds that essences are hard to come by.

If we

thought essences were the only suitable descriptions under

which we had de re beliefs, we would likely not have de re
beliefs at all, for the essence of a thing is an extremely
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rich property that will single out an individual from all

inhabitants of this world, and from all that individual's

"not-quite-counter-parts" at every other possible world.

In

general, Lewis argues that we don't form beliefs de re about

individuals in virtue of knowing their essences.
Alternatively, Lewis proposes that we form de re

beliefs about individuals when we bear to them a "relation
of acquaintance."

This is the case when:

I and the one of whom I have
beliefs de re are so related that there
is an extensive causal dependence of my
states upon his; and this causal
dependence is of a sort apt for the
reliable transmission of information 24
.

.

.

.

The examples Lewis uses to illustrate belief de re indicate
that at least some ordinary definite descriptions are

sufficient for establishing a relation of acquaintance.

For

example, one can be 'acquainted' with Hume by ascribing

nobility to Hume under the description 'the one
of under the name of 'Hume''.

I

have heard

Moreover, we sometimes form

de re beliefs about ourselves that involve a relation of

Lewis says:

acquaintance.

watching is a relation of
I watch myself in
acquaintance.
reflecting glass, unaware that I am
I ascribe to myself
watching myself.
under the description "the one I am
watching," the property of wearing pants
I therefore believe
that are on fire.
de re of the one I am watching that is,
But
myself that his pants are on fire.
of
property
I do not self-ascribe the
so
wearing pants that are on fire.
same
the
quite
self-ascription isn't
thing as ascription, de re to oneself.
.

.

.

—

—

.
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.

.

.

.

The suitable description
(DR)

•

Z
•

that occurs in Lewis's

is analogous to Chisholm's identifying
relation 'R'

that occurs in (D2) and (D3)

.

Both Chisholm and Lewis

analyze third person attributions of belief
by means of
relation, specifiable by a description.

a

We might interpret Lewis's property theory
to entail

inaccessible beliefs in the following way.

Suppose that

these two sentences are true:
(9) You are making a mess (uttered by Mary,
while pointing to Beth Dixon)

(10)

I

am making a mess (uttered by Beth

Dixon)
If beliefs are individuated by the properties Mary and

self-ascribe, then we believe different things.

I

Mary

ascribes to me the property making a mess if and only if she
ascribes this property to me under some description
either captures my essence or is
that Mary bears to me.
if,

a

Z
'

'

that

relation of acquaintance

The latter condition is satisfied

for example, Mary ascribes making a mess to me under the

description 'the only shopper in aisle five'.
analysis of Mary's belief in

(9)

The full

will involve that she self-

ascribe the property: inhabiting a world where the only

shopper in aisle five is making a mess
(10)

.

As we have noted,

will be analyzed as Beth Dixon's self-ascription of the

property: making

a

mess

.

Since Mary and

I

self-ascribe

different properties, we believe different things.
On the basis of Lewis's principle (DR) we can infer

that beliefs about individuals other than oneself will
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—

,

always involve the self-ascription of

a

descriptive relation

that the believer bears to the object of
her belief. No one
can believe what I believe about myself
when I believe that
I am making a mess because, in
self-ascribing making a
I

do not specify any descriptive relation that

myself.

I

bear to

if beliefs are individuated by properties
that are

self-ascribed, then there is a sense in which my belief

about myself is inaccessible to all others.
The easiest way to avoid this kind of inaccessibility
is to argue that not all beliefs must be individuated by the

property that is self— ascribed.

Just as Chisholm might say

that Mary indirectly attributes the same property to me that
I

directly attribute to myself; Lewis can claim that Mary

ascribes the property making

description
mess.

Z
'

'

while

I

a

mess to me under some

self-ascribe the property making

a

Since we ascribe the same property to the same

object, we believe the same thing.

In this way privileged

access is easily avoided on Lewis's theory.

Beliefs are in the Head
If there is a disadvantage to Lewis's theory,

it is

that individuating beliefs by properties is not sufficiently

complex enough to represent our various ways of making
belief attributions.

In the following passage Lewis

considers Perry's example of mad Heimson, who, believing

himself to be Hume, self-ascribes the same property that
Hume self-ascribes

being identical to Hume
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.

There are two ways out.
(l) Heimson
does not, after all, believe what Hume
did, or (2) Heimson does believe
what
Hume did, but Heimson believes falsely
what Hume believed truly.
If we can agree that beliefs are in
the head, so that Heimson and Hume may
indeed believe alike, then the first way
out is shut.
We must take the second.
Heimson s belief and Hume's have the
same object, but Heimson is wrong and
Hume is right
the object of their
shared belief
is a property: the
property of being Hume. Hume selfascribes this property; he has it; he is
right.
Heimson, believing just what
Hume does, self-ascribes the very same
property; he lacks it; he is wrong. 26
.

|

.

.

.

.

.

.

From this passage we see Lewis is committed to

individuating beliefs by properties, or what he refers to as
'the objects'

of belief.

For Lewis, Heimson and Hume have

the same belief even though it is false that Heimson has the

property being identical to Hume

.

But the fact that we can

assign different truth-values to what Heimson and Hume

believe suggests there is a difference in their beliefs.
Moreover, we also want to say that two individuals believe

differently in the case where they both truthfully selfascribe the same property.

Nevertheless, Lewis appears to

have his own reasons for individuating beliefs by
properties.

About the case of mad Heimson who believes

himself to be Hume, Lewis says:
Heimson may have got his head into
perfect match with Hume's in every way
that is at all relevant to what he
believes.
If nevertheless Heimson and
Hume do not believe alike, then beliefs
They depend partly
ain't in the head
on something else, so that if your head
is in a certain state and you're Hume
you believe one thing, but if your head
!
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is in that same state and you're
Heimson
you believe something else. Not
good.
The main purpose of assigning objects
of
attitudes is, I take it, to characterize
states of the head: to specify their
causal role with respect to behavior,
stimuli, and one another.
if the
assignment of objects depends partly on
something besides the state of the head,
it will not serve this purpose.
The
states it characterizes will not be the
occupants of the causal roles 27
.

What Lewis says appears to be a positive proposal for

individuating the objects of belief by the self —ascribed
properties.

But since Lewis offers no explanation for

beliefs being 'in the head', it is difficult to evaluate
this proposal 28
.

The complaint seems to be that if beliefs

are not in the head they will fail to serve as the occupants
of causal roles in explanations of behavior.

I

presume

Lewis means that we want to be able to say, when Mary and

both self-ascribe the property making a mess
same thing.

,

I

we believe the

And, our beliefs play the same causal role with

respect to our behavior.

Specifically, the object of belief

should figure in our subsequent, cart-straightening
behavior.

This much of Lewis's claim is uncontroversial

Any

.

plausible theory of belief should explain how beliefs

contribute to explanations of behavior.
beliefs to play a causal role is not

a

But requiring

convincing reason for

individuating beliefs by properties alone.

This prevents us

from saying that there is a sense in which Mary and

believe differently when we each self-ascribe making

I

a

Giving up this way of individuating indexical belief is
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mess

.

unnecessary when there are alternative analyses
that seem
designed to accommodate this way of individuating

indexical

belief.

Consider the following example discussed by
David

Kaplan:

We raise two identical twins, Castor and
Pollux, under qualitatively identical
conditions, qualitatively identical
stimuli, etc.
If necessary, we may
monitor their brain states and make
small corrections in their brain
structures if they begin drifting
apart.
They respond to all cognitive
stimuli in identical fashion. Have we
not been successful in achieving the
same cognitive state? Of course we
have, what more could one ask!
But
wait, they believe different things.
Each sincerely says, "My brother was
born before I was" and the beliefs they
thereby express conflict.
In this,
Castor speaks the truth, while Pollux
speaks falsely. This does not reflect
on the identity of their cognitive
states, for, as Putnam has emphasized,
circumstances alone do not determine
extension (here, the truth value) from
cognitive state.
Insofar as distinct
persons can be in the same cognitive
state, Castor and Pollux are 39
.

Kaplan invokes the notions of character and content to

explain the cognitive states and belief content of Castor
and Pollux.

I

believe Kaplan is right to try to accommodate

two ways of individuating indexical belief:
In discussing the twins, I tried to show
that persons could be in the same total
cognitive state and still, as we would
say, believe different things 30
.

As a theory of belief

,

Lewis's property theory is not

complex enough to allow us to say that Castor and Pollux are
in the same cognitive

different things.

I

(belief)

state and that they believe

think this is
154

a

disadvantage of Lewis's

theory, especially when there may be viable
alternatives to

analyzing self-attribution that permit us to individuate
indexical belief in a more intuitively plausible way.

Perry's distinction between propositional content and belief
states, or Kaplan's distinction between character and

content are more suitable for explaining attributions of
indexical belief.
To summarize,

it appears that the property theories of

belief proposed by Chisholm and Lewis do not commit us to

privileged access of the sort entailed by the two-place
propositional theory.

Nevertheless,

I

am still reluctant to

endorse these property theories for the following reasons.

Chisholm suggests that his analysis of de se belief in terms
of direct attribution can be extended to propositional

attitudes other than 'believes', but it is difficult to see
how this project is to be carried out.

Lewis suggests that

individuating beliefs by properties is consistent with the

requirement that beliefs be in the head.

But Lewis is not

specific about the proposal he is recommending for the

narrow individuation of belief content.

Furthermore,

individuating belief content by properties alone does not
allow us to say that there is a sense in which Mary and

I

believe differently when we both self-ascribe the property

making a mess

.

This is not

a

serious charge against Lewis's

proposal, but it indicates that individuating beliefs by

properties is not sufficient for representing our ordinary
ways of attributing and reporting indexical beliefs.
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CHAPTER

8

CONCLUSION
In this dissertation I have investigated
the nature of

privileged access

how it arises, why it is objectionable,

and ways to avoid it.

I

review the results of this

investigation below.
In Chapter One I discuss what is common to the

analyses of indexical belief that follow in later chapters.
All of the analyses

present in the dissertation, with the

I

possible exception of Chisholm in Person and Object
what

I

have called the

'

Irreplacability Thesis'.

,

endorse

This

thesis restricts the co-referential substitution of

'I'

or

'she herself' when these first-person reflexive pronouns are

embedded behind propositional attitude verbs like 'believes'
or

'

knows

'

In Chapter Two,

present an argument for the existence

I

of first-person propositions.

The Basic Argument entails

that the agents of first-person indexical sentences have

privileged access to the first-person propositions expressed
by these sentences.
As

I

show in Chapters Three, Four, and Five, the Basic

Argument is essentially unaffected by characterizing the
objects of belief and knowledge as first-person

propositional guises, propositions that entail individual
essences, or Fregean

I
'

'

-thoughts

.

We are still left with

an analysis of self-attribution that entails privileged

access for the agents of first-person indexical sentences.
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The common thread running through each
of these proposals is
the assumption that belief is a two-place
relation.
In Chapter Six

I

relations of belief.

consider an alternative to two-place
Perry proposes we analyze indexical

belief as a three-place relation between an
individual,
belief state, and a proposition.
to avoid privileged access.

a

in this way Perry is able

But Perry's proposal is not

entirely satisfactory because he fails to formulate an
adequate individuation principle for belief states.
In Chapter Seven

I

present the Chisholm and Lewis

proposal that first-person indexical belief be analyzed as

two-place relation between a believer and

a

property.

a

On a

superficial reading of these theories, we might think they
entail a version of privileged access.

I

argue that the

analysis of indexical belief by properties that are directly

attributed or self-ascribed does not entail privileged
access, though for other reasons

I

am reluctant to fully

endorse these theories.
By examining each of these ways of analyzing self-

attribution, a pattern begins to emerge.
is that inaccessibility,

What is revealed

in one form or another,

follows

from all the two-place propositional theories of belief

have considered.

I

I

speculate below about why privileged

access arises for these particular theories.
I

maintain that privileged access is created by

conflating two different ways of individuating indexical
belief.

Indexical belief is ambiguous between what
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I

call

the 'psychological role' and the
of belief.

'

referential/semantic role'

Intuitively, we recognize there are two

different ways of individuating the beliefs
of individuals
who report their beliefs by a first-person
indexical

sentence.

For example, when Mary and

both report

I

'I

am

rich' and believe what we say, then in one sense,
Mary and

believe the same thing.

I

Individuating beliefs in this way

allows us to explain and predict why Mary and

I

exhibit the

same kind of behavior (eating at expensive resturants, etc.)
in virtue of sharing the same belief.

This sense of belief

is the psychological role of belief.

In another sense, Mary and

we both utter
I

'I

I

am rich', because

believe differently when
'I'

in the context where

utter this sentence refers to me, and

in the context

'I'

where Mary is the speaker refers to Mary.

Because our

beliefs are about different people, we believe different
things.

Indexical beliefs individuated in this way have

referential or semantic role.

a

Belief has a semantic aspect

because we can make reference to the truth-conditions of

utterances to individuate indexical beliefs.
(and believe)

What

I

say

is true, while it is possible that what Mary

says (and believes)

is false.

So, what we say

(and believe)

are different.

Combining both ways of individuating indexical belief
creates privileged access.
example.

We can see this by a simple

Individuating indexical belief by its

psychological role has the result that
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I

do not believe the

same thing when

I

utter

am rich' and 'She is rich'

'I

pointing to my own mirror reflection)
goes,

I

I

As the reasoning

may not recognize myself in the mirror, so

believe what
what

.

express by

I

'

I

I

may

am rich' but fail to believe

express by 'She is rich'

reflection).

(while

Moreover, when

I

(while pointing to my own

utter,

'I

am rich' and Mary

utters 'She is rich' while pointing to me, we do not believe
the same thing.

Even though we have formed beliefs about

one and the same person, these beliefs play different roles
in explaining our behavior.

My belief causes me to eat at

expensive restaurants, while Mary's belief causes her to
turn green with envy.

In this sense we believe differently.

If we also individuate beliefs by what

referential role, then if Mary and

Mary and

I

I

am calling its

I

both utter

have different beliefs because

am rich',

'I

refers to

'I'

different people in the context of our utterances.

The

combined result of using both the psychological and
referential roles to individuate belief is that no one but
can believe what
but

I

can use

'I'

express by

I

'I

to report what

I

am rich', because no one
I

believe.

I

have

privileged access to my indexical belief because we have
individuated this belief according to both the referential
and psychological roles.

Ordinarily, we do not use both roles together to

individuate indexical belief.
and

I

both utter

'I

am rich',

We normally say that if Mary
in one sense Mary and I

believe the same thing, and in another sense Mary and
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I

believe differently.

But when self-attribution is
analyzed

as a two-place relation between an
individual and a

proposition, these two ways of individuating
belief content
are conflated in the second term of the
relation—
the

proposition.

Propositions are sometimes construed as the
semantic objects assigned to an utterance of an
indexical
sentence.

So,

the proposition expressed by an indexical

sentence in a context is the bearer of truth and falsity,
individuated by its semantic content according to the

referent of

'I'

in a particular context.

In addition,

though, the proposition expressed by an utterance of an

indexical sentence is also the object of belief for the
speaker.

As such, the proposition is also required to play

a causal role in explanations of behavior.

If propositions

are what is believed, we will want to individuate them

according to the psychological role of belief.
Because propositions have both

a

semantic role and a

psychological role as the objects of belief, they are
individuated according to both of these senses of belief
have identified.

I

When we try to individuate propositions

according to both roles, the result is first-person

propositions and privileged access for the agents of
indexical sentences.

Privileged access is entailed by two-

place relations of belief because the psychological object
of belief must be one and the same as the semantic object

expressed by the embedded indexical sentence.

Because this

is so we cannot expect to avoid inaccessibility by
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introducing propositional guises, individual
essences, or
I
Fregean
-thoughts as the objects of belief.
'

'

My

examination of these various proposals supports this
conclusion.

What is wrong with this kind of privileged access?

My

complaints about first-person propositions are that they

undermine the traditional conception of
publicly accessible entity.

a

proposition as

a

Without this traditional way of

characterizing propositions it is difficult to explain how

propositions can be the bearers of truth and falsity, and
how communication between language users takes place.
Furthermore, inaccessible beliefs interfere with our

ordinary way of ascribing beliefs.
a

We use belief content in

variety of ways to communicate about psychological states,

to report about our own beliefs and the beliefs of others,

and to explain behavior by appealing to what is believed.

Ordinarily, we want to be able to say that when

that

I

am rich, and Mary believes that

I

I

believe

am rich, we have

the same belief. And further, to use the common content of

our beliefs to explain reasons for acting in a psychology
of human behavior.

Beliefs that are inaccessible interfere

with our "folk psychology " 1 about human action and
behavior.

In short, privileged acess threatens our common

sense conception of belief, and the conception of a

proposition firmly embedded in the philosophical literature.
By this

I

have not shown that any analysis of belief that

entails inaccessiblity is false.

165

It is always possible to

argue that we should, instead, relinquish
a particular
conception of propositions as well as our
ordinary ways of
talking about indexical belief. But I think
this
is a

drastic step, and unnecessary.

As we have already seen in

Chapters Six and Seven, there are other theories
of belief
that avoid privileged access.
If

I

am right about why inaccessibility arises for two-

place propositional theories of belief, then three-place

relations of belief, such as the analysis Perry offers,
appear the most promising way to avoid this consequence.

A

three-place relation allows us to treat indexical belief as

genuinely ambiguous in its analysis.

We can use one term in

the relation to individuate beliefs by their psychological
role, and the other term to individuate beliefs by their

referential role.

Though Perry's analysis suffers from lack

of a plausible individuation principle for belief states,

his three-place relation is the right way to avoid

collapsing these two different senses of belief.

Perry

uses belief states to individuate beliefs by their

psychological role, and the singular proposition expressed
by an indexical sentence to individuate beliefs by their

referential or semantic role.

Though other philosophers may be less concerned than

with privileged access and the problems that follow from

I

it,

there is some agreement that the analysis of indexical
I

have been calling

its psychological and referential roles.

In Knowing Who ,^

belief should accommodate both of what
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f
•

#

Boer and Lycan distinguish two schemes for interpretating
se ^ -a ttr ibuted belief and knowledge: a functional or

computational scheme (the causal role of belief and
knowledge), and a referential or truth-conditional scheme.

Following Boer and Lycan in their representation of these
two different schemes, Jay Garfield distinguishes the

semantics of self-attributed beliefs from the psychological
states that are causally efficacious in bringing about

behavior

3

And, Colin McGinn has argued for a "dual

.

aspect" theory of belief content, in which he identifies two

— the

separable components

causal-explanatory role of belief,

and beliefs as "items possessed of referential truth-

conditions

.

"4

These proposals may be problematic for reasons that

have nothing to do with privileged access.

examination will have to be postponed.

A close

But now, at least,

knowing more about what privileged access is, the problems
it creates,

and how it arises,

I

am optimistic we can

formulate a theory of self-attribution that is more

plausible than any

I

have considered here.
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Notes
1.

This expression has been used by a number of contemporary
philosophers writing in the philosophy of mind. For
example, Stephen Stich says, "In our everyday dealings with
one another we invoke a variety of commonsense psychological
terms including 'believe', 'remember', 'feel', 'think',
'desire', 'prefer', 'imagine', 'fear', and many others.
The
use
these
of
terms
is
governed
by
a
loose
knit
network
of
2.
largely tacit principles, platitudes, and paradigms which
constitute a sort of folk theory." Following recent
practice,
I will call this network folk psychology
3.
.

4.

Steven Boer and W.G. Lycan, Knowing Who

.

MIT Press,

1986.

Jay Garfield, Belief in Psychology: A Study in the
Ontology of Mind MIT Press, 1988.
.

Colin McGinn, "The Structure of Content," in Thought and
Object: Essays on Intentionalitv ed. by Andrew Woodfield,
Clarendon Press, 1982, pages 207-258.
.
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